LUCHINI Stephane

Objectives: This note provides an assessment of COVID-19 acceleration among groups with different vaccine status in France. Methods: We assess viral acceleration using a novel indicator introduced in Baunez et al. (2021). The acceleration index relates the percentage change of tests that have been performed on a given day to the percentage change in the associated positive cases that same day. We compare viral acceleration among vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals in France over the period May 31st-August 29, 2021. Results: Once the state of the epidemic within each groups is accounted for, it turns out that viral acceleration has since mid-July converged to similar levels among vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals in France, even though viral speed is larger for the latter group compared to the former. Conclusion: Our results call for an increasing testing effort for both vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals, in view of the fact that viral circulation is currently accelerating at similar levels for both groups in France.

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Even though much has been learned about the new pathogen SARS-CoV-2 since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, a lot of uncertainty remains. In this paper we argue that what is important to know under uncertainty is whether harm accelerates and whether health policies achieve deceleration of harm. For this, we need to see cases in relation to diagnostic effort and not to look at indicators based on cases only, such as a number of widely used epidemiological indicators, including the reproduction number, do. To do so overlooks a crucial dimension, namely the fact that the best we can know about cases will depend on some welldefined strategy of diagnostic effort, such as testing in the case of COVID-19. We will present a newly developed indicator to observe harm, the acceleration index, which is essentially an elasticity of cases in relation to tests. We will discuss what efficiency of testing means and propose that the corresponding health policy goal should be to find ever fewer cases with an ever-greater diagnostic effort. Easy and low-threshold testing will also be a means to give back people’s sovereignty to lead their life in an “open” as opposed to “locked-down” society.

We propose a structural econometric model that incorporates altruism towards other household members into the willingness to pay for a public good. The model distinguishes preferences for public good improvements for oneself from preferences for improvements for other household members. We test for three different types of altruism - ‘pure self-interest’, ‘pure altruism’ and ‘public-good-focused non-pure altruism’. Using French contingent valuation data regarding air quality improvements, we find positive and significant degrees of concern for children under the age of 18, which are explained by determinants related to health and subjective air quality assessment. All other forms of pure or air-quality-focused altruism within the family are insignificant, including for children over 18, siblings, spouses, and parents. This result suggests that benefit estimates that do not consider altruism could undervalue improvements in air quality in France.

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BACKGROUND: Opinion polls on vaccination intentions suggest that COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy is increasing worldwide. however, the usefulness of opinion polls to prepare mass vaccination campaigns for specific new vaccines and to estimate acceptance in a country's population is limited. We therefore aimed to assess the effects of vaccine characteristics, information on herd immunity, and general practitioner (GP) recommendation on vaccine hesitancy in a representative working-age population in France. METHODS: In this survey experiment, adults aged 18-64 years residing in France, with no history of SARS-CoV-2 infection, were randomly selected from an online survey research panel in July, 2020, stratified by gender, age, education, household size, and region and area of residence to be representative of the French population. Participants completed an online questionnaire on their background and vaccination behaviour-related variables (including past vaccine compliance, risk factors for severe COVID-19, and COVID-19 perceptions and experience), and were then randomly assigned according to a full factorial design to one of three groups to receive differing information on herd immunity (>50% of adults aged 18-64 years must be immunised [either by vaccination or infection]. >50% of adults must be immunised [either by vaccination or infection]. or no information on herd immunity) and to one of two groups regarding GP recommendation of vaccination (GP recommends vaccination or expresses no opinion). Participants then completed a series of eight discrete choice tasks designed to assess vaccine acceptance or refusal based on hypothetical vaccine characteristics (efficacy [50%, 80%, 90%, or 100%], risk of serious side-effects [1 in 10 000 or 1 in 100 000], location of manufacture [EU, USA, or China], and place of administration [GP practice, local pharmacy, or mass vaccination centre]). Responses were analysed with a two-part model to disentangle outright vaccine refusal (irrespective of vaccine characteristics, defined as opting for no vaccination in all eight tasks) from vaccine hesitancy (acceptance depending on vaccine characteristics). FINDINGS: Survey responses were collected from 1942 working-age adults, of whom 560 (28·8%) opted for no vaccination in all eight tasks (outright vaccine refusal) and 1382 (71·2%) did not. In our model, outright vaccine refusal and vaccine hesitancy were both significantly associated with female gender, age (with an inverted U-shaped relationship), lower educational level, poor compliance with recommended vaccinations in the past, and no report of specified chronic conditions (ie, no hypertension [for vaccine hesitancy] or no chronic conditions other than hypertension [for outright vaccine refusal]). Outright vaccine refusal was also associated with a lower perceived severity of COVID-19, whereas vaccine hesitancy was lower when herd immunity benefits were communicated and in working versus non-working individuals, and those with experience of COVID-19 (had symptoms or knew someone with COVID-19). For a mass vaccination campaign involving mass vaccination centres and communication of herd immunity benefits, our model predicted outright vaccine refusal in 29·4% (95% CI 28·6-30·2) of the French working-age population. Predicted hesitancy was highest for vaccines manufactured in China with 50% efficacy and a 1 in 10 000 risk of serious side-effects (vaccine acceptance 27·4% [26·8-28·0]), and lowest for a vaccine manufactured in the EU with 90% efficacy and a 1 in 100 000 risk of serious side-effects (vaccine acceptance 61·3% [60·5-62·1]). INTERPRETATION: COVID-19 vaccine acceptance depends on the characteristics of new vaccines and the national vaccination strategy, among various other factors, in the working-age population in France. FUNDING: French Public Health Agency (Santé Publique France).

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In a competitive business environment, dishonesty can pay. Self-interested executives and managers can have incentive to shade the truth for personal gain. In response, the business community has considered how to commit these executives and managers to a higher ethical standard. The MBA Oath and the Dutch Bankers Oath are examples of such a commitment device. The question we test herein is whether the oath can be used as an effective form of ethics management for future executives/managers-who for our experiment we recruited from a leading French business school-by actually improving their honesty. Using a classic Sender-Receiver strategic game experiment, we reinforce professional identity by pre-selecting the group to which Receivers belong. This allows us to determine whether taking the oath deters lying among future managers.

An acceleration index is proposed as a novel indicator to track the dynamics of COVID-19 in real-time. Using data on cases and tests in France for the period between the first and second lock-downs—May 13 to October 25, 2020—our acceleration index shows that the pandemic resurgence can be dated to begin around July 7. It uncovers that the pandemic acceleration was stronger than national average for the [59–68] and especially the 69 and older age groups since early September, the latter being associated with the strongest acceleration index, as of October 25. In contrast, acceleration among the [19–28] age group was the lowest and is about half that of the [69–78]. In addition, we propose an algorithm to allocate tests among French “départements” (roughly counties), based on both the acceleration index and the feedback effect of testing. Our acceleration-based allocation differs from the actual distribution over French territories, which is population-based. We argue that both our acceleration index and our allocation algorithm are useful tools to guide public health policies as France might possibly enter a third lock-down period with indeterminate duration.

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This study explores whether an oath to honesty can reduce both shirking and lying among crowd-sourced internet workers. Using a classic coin-flip experiment, we first confirm that a substantial majority of Mechanical Turk workers both shirk and lie when reporting the number of heads flipped. We then demonstrate that lying can be reduced by first asking each worker to swear voluntarily on his or her honor to tell the truth in subsequent economic decisions. Even in this online, purely anonymous environment, the oath significantly reduced the percent of subjects telling “big” lies (by roughly 27%), but did not affect shirking. We also explore whether a truth-telling oath can be used as a screening device if implemented after decisions have been made. Conditional on flipping response, MTurk shirkers and workers who lied were significantly less likely to agree to an ex-post honesty oath. Our results suggest oaths may help elicit more truthful behavior, even in online crowd-sourced environments.

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In this thesis we explore how individuals who report different levels of well-being remember economic information differently. In the first chapter we first show a correlation between the way people remember their salary and their level of satisfaction with it: relatively more satisfied employees tend to overestimate their salary, while relatively less satisfied employees tend to underestimate it. In the second chapter we try to understand how people who are more or less satisfied with their lives remember their past well-being differently. Again, a deep asymmetry is discovered: happy people tend to overestimate the evolution of their happiness over time, while unhappy people tend to underestimate it. The third chapter is devoted to the study of the causes of this asymmetry in memory patterns. In a laboratory experiment we study whether individuals forget a failure because they are doing well or in order to get better. Our results support the second hypothesis but contradict the first. The fourth and final chapter draws on the knowledge built in the previous chapters and uses individual memories to study the heterogeneous effect of inflation on material welfare inequalities.

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Tests are crucial to know about the number of people who have fallen ill with COVID-19 and to understand in real-time whether the dynamics of the pandemic is accelerating or decelerating. But tests are a scarce resource in many countries. The key but still open question is thus how to allocate tests across sub-national levels. We provide a data-driven and operational criterion to allocate tests efficiently across regions or provinces, with the view to maximize detection of people who have been infected. We apply our criterion to Italian regions and compute the shares of tests that should go to each region, which are shown to differ significantly from the actual distribution.

The back cover states: "Tax evasion is a subject that eludes the tools of traditional economic analysis. Like any illegal activity, it escapes the researcher's observation and is hidden from the authorities, which makes empirical analyses of the phenomenon difficult. On the theoretical level, the application of the cost-benefit calculation that the "rational" taxpayer is supposed to make leads to a paradox: contrary to a widely held idea, the benefits of fraud are so high, and the risk of punishment so low, that one may be surprised that it remains so limited. This double challenge posed by tax evasion decisions has only recently been addressed, thanks to the emergence of a new approach, behavioral economics, which relies on psychology to shed light on economic behavior, and of a new method, experimental economics, which makes it possible to empirically study economic behavior on which it is difficult to collect convincing data. This booklet reports on the results of this work and presents an overview of the tax policy tools that have emerged from it.

This note provides an early assessment of the reinforced measures to curb the COVID-19 pandemic in France, which include a curfew of selected areas and culminate in a second COVID-19-related lock-down that started on October 30, 2020 and is still ongoing. We analyse the change in virus propagation across age groups and across départements using an acceleration index introduced in Baunez et al. (2020). We find that while the pandemic is still in the acceleration regime, acceleration decreased notably with curfew measures and this more rapidly so for the more vulnerable population group, that is, for people older than 60. Acceleration continued to decline under lock-down, but more so for the active population under 60 than for those above 60. For the youngest population aged 0 to 19, curfew measures did not reduce acceleration but lock-down does. This suggests that if health policies aim at protecting the elderly population generally more at risk to suffer severe consequences from COVID-19, curfew measures may be effective enough. However, looking at the departmental map of France, we find that curfews have not necessarily been imposed in départements where acceleration was the largest.

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We show that the acceleration index, a novel indicator that measures acceleration and deceleration of viral spread (Baunez et al. 2020a,b), is essentially a test-controlled version of the reproduction number. As such it is a more accurate indicator to track the dynamics of an infectious disease outbreak in real time. We indicate a discrepancy between the acceleration index and the reproduction number, based on the infectivity and test rates and we provide a formal decomposition of this difference. When applied to French data for the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, our decomposition shows that the reproduction number consistently underestimates the resurgence of the pandemic since the summer of 2020, compared to the acceleration index which accounts for the time-varying volume of tests. Because the acceleration index aggregates all the relevant information and captures in real time the sizeable time variation featured by viral circulation, it is a sufficient statistic to track the pandemic’s propagation.

This chapter presents an intuitive overview of the methods that researchers can use to estimate the monetary value of changes in health outcomes. These methods are separated into two categories: stated preference methods and revealed preference methods. Stated preference methods ask people how much they are willing to pay for health improvements directly using surveys of the relevant population. Revealed preference methods infer the trade-offs that people make between health and money indirectly by observing everyday behavior, such as when people accept a riskier job in return for higher wages. or when they buy products to protect their health from hazards. The chapter discusses the main advantages and disadvantages of each method.

The radical uncertainty around the current COVID19 pandemics requires that governments around the world should be able to track in real time not only how the virus spreads but, most importantly, what policies are effective in keeping the spread of the disease under check. To improve the quality of health decision-making, we argue that it is necessary to monitor and compare acceleration/deceleration of confirmed cases over health policy responses, across countries. To do so, we provide a simple mathematical tool to estimate the convexity/concavity of trends in epidemiological surveillance data. Had it been applied at the onset of the crisis, it would have offered more opportunities to measure the impact of the policies undertaken in different Asian countries, and to allow European and North-American governments to draw quicker lessons from these Asian experiences when making policy decisions. Our tool can be especially useful as the epidemic is currently extending to lower-income African and South American countries, some of which have weaker health systems.

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Tax evasion is a subject that eludes the tools of traditional economic analysis. On the one hand, like any illegal activity, tax evasion escapes the researcher's observation while at the same time hiding from the authorities: empirical analysis of its scope, its determinants and the way in which different systems affect it is necessarily very limited. On the other hand, from a theoretical point of view, the simple application of the cost-benefit calculation that the "rational" taxpayer is supposed to make leads to a paradox: contrary to a widely held idea, the benefits of tax evasion are so high, and the risk of punishment so low, that it is surprising that it is so little practiced in all developed economies. Rather than tax evasion, it is therefore "tax compliance" that constitutes its counterpart, the willingness to pay taxes, which needs to be explained in order to understand its determinants. The dual challenge posed by tax evasion decisions to economic analysis has only recently been met, thanks to the emergence, over the last twenty years, of a new approach, behavioral economics, which relies on psychology to better understand economic behavior, and, at the same time, of a new method, experimental economics, which makes it possible to study empirically economic behavior for which it is difficult to collect convincing data. This booklet reports on the results of this work and presents an overview of the tax policy tools that have emerged from it.

Tax evasion is a subject that eludes the tools of traditional economic analysis. On the one hand, like any illegal activity, tax evasion escapes the researcher's observation while at the same time hiding from the authorities: empirical analysis of its scope, its determinants and the way in which different mechanisms affect it is necessarily very limited. On the other hand, from a theoretical point of view, the simple application of the cost-benefit calculation that the "rational" taxpayer is supposed to make leads to a paradox: contrary to a widely held idea, the benefits of tax evasion are so high, and the risk of punishment so low, that it is surprising that it is so little practiced in all developed economies. Rather than tax evasion, it is therefore "tax compliance" that constitutes its counterpart, the willingness to pay tax, that needs to be explained in order to understand its determinants. The double challenge that tax evasion decisions pose to economic analysis has only recently been met, thanks to the emergence, over the last twenty years, of a new approach, behavioral economics, which relies on psychology to better understand economic behavior. And, at the same time, of a new method, experimental economics, which allows for the empirical study of economic behavior on which it is difficult to collect convincing data. This booklet reports on the results of this work and presents an overview of the tax policy tools that have emerged from it.

Tests are crucial to know about the number of people who have fallen ill with COVID-19 and to understand in real-time whether the dynamics of the pandemic is accelerating or decelerating. But tests are a scarce resource in many countries. The key but still open question is thus how to allocate tests across sub-national levels. We provide a data-driven and operational criterion to allocate tests efficiently across regions or provinces, with the view to maximize detection of people who have been infected. We apply our criterion to Italian regions and compute the shares of tests that should go to each region, which are shown to differ significantly from the actual distribution.

An acceleration index is proposed as a novel indicator to track the dynamics of the COVID-19 in real-time. Using French data on cases and tests for the period following the first lock-down-from May 13, 2020, onwards-our acceleration index shows that the ongoing pandemic resurgence can be dated to begin around July 7. It uncovers that the pandemic acceleration has been stronger than national average for the [59 − 68] and especially the 69 and older age groups since early September, the latter being associated with the strongest acceleration index, as of October 25. In contrast, acceleration among the [19 − 28] age group is the lowest and is about half that of the [69 − 78], as of October 25. In addition, we propose an algorithm to allocate tests among French départements, based on both the acceleration index and the feedback effect of testing. Our acceleration-based allocation differs from the actual distribution over French territories, which is population-based. We argue that both our acceleration index and our allocation algorithm are useful tools to guide public health policies as France enters a second lock-down period with indeterminate duration.

Background : Health state utility (HSU) is a core component of QALYs and cost-effectiveness analysis, although HSU is rarely estimated among a representative sample of patients. We explored the feasibility of assessing HSU in head and neck cancer from the French National Hospital Discharge database. Methods: An exhaustive sample of 53,258 incident adult patients with a first diagnosis of head and neck cancer was identified in 2010–2012. We used a cross-sectional approach to define five health states over two periods: three "cancer stages at initial treatment" (early, locally advanced or metastatic stage). a "relapse state" and otherwise a "relapse-free state" in the follow-up of patients initially treated at early or locally advanced stage. In patients admitted in post-acute care, a two-parameter graded response model (Item Response Theory) was estimated from all 144,012 records of six Activities of Daily Living (ADLs) and the latent health state scale underlying ADLs was calibrated with the French EQ-5D-3 L social value set. Following linear interpolation between all assessments of the patient, daily estimates of utility in post-acute care were averaged by health state, patient and month of follow-up. Finally, HSU was estimated by health state and month of follow-up for the whole patient population after controlling for survivorship and selection in post-acute care. Results: Head and neck cancer was generally associated with poor HSU estimates in a real-life setting. As compared to “distant metastasis at initial treatment”, mean HSU was higher in other health states, although numerical differences were small (0.45 versus around 0.54). It was primarily explained by the negative effects on HSU of an older age (38.4% aged ≥70 years in “early stage at initial treatment”) and comorbidities (> 50% in other health states). HSU estimates significantly improved over time in the “relapse-free state” (from 8 to 12 months of follow-up). Conclusions: HSU estimates in head and neck cancer were primarily driven by age at diagnosis, comorbidities, and time to assessment of cancer survivors. This feasibility study highlights the potential of estimating HSU within and across severe conditions in a systematic way at the national level.

Why do people pay taxes? Rational choice theory has fallen short in answering this question. Another explanation, called "tax morale", has been promoted. Tax morale captures the behavioral idea that non-monetary preferences (like norm-submission, moral emotions and moral judgments) might be better determinants of tax compliance than monetary trade-offs. Herein we report on two lab experiments designed to assess whether norm-submission, moral emotions (e.g., affective empathy, cognitive empathy, propensity to feel guilt and shame) or moral judgments (e.g., ethics principles, integrity, and moralization of everyday life) can help explain compliance behavior. Although we find statistically significant correlations of tax compliance behavior with empathy and shame, the economic significance of these correlations are low more than 80% of the variability in compliance remains unexplained. These results suggest that tax authorities should focus on the institutional context, rather than individual preference characteristics, to handle tax evasion.

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Oath-taking for senior executives has been promoted as a mean to enhance honesty within and towards organizations. Herein we explore whether people who voluntarily sign a solemn truth-telling oath are more committed to sincere behavior when offered the chance to lie. We design an experiment to test how the oath affects truth-telling in two contexts: a neutral context replicating the typical experiment in the literature, and a "loaded" context in which we remind subjects that "a lie is a lie." We consider four payoff configurations, with differential monetary incentives to lie, implemented as within-subjects treatment variables. The results are reinforced by robustness investigations in which each subject made only one lying decision. Our results show that the oath reduces lying, especially in the loaded environment-falsehoods are reduced by fifty percent. The oath, however, have a weaker effect on lying in the neutral environment. The oath did affect decision times in all instances: the average person takes significantly more time deciding whether to lie under oath.

Using discrete choices to elicit preferences is a major tool to help guide public policy. Although Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) remains by far the most popular mechanism used to elicit preferences, its reliability still is questionable. Using an induced value experimental design, we show that standard benchmarks achieve no more than 56% (hypothetical answers with no monetary incentives) to 60% (real monetary incentives) of payoff maximizing choices. Herein we demonstrate that having respondents sign a the truth-telling oath reduces non-payoff maximizing choices by nearly 50% relative to these benchmarks. The explicit and voluntary commitment to honesty improved decisions. Further, we show that it is the explicit commitment to honesty induced by the truth-telling oath improves choices, not just any oath mechanism, i.e., an oath to task or to duty did not improve choices.

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Oath taking for senior executives has been promoted as a means to enhance honesty within and toward organizations. Herein we explore whether people who voluntarily sign a solemn truth-telling oath are more committed to sincere behavior when offered the chance to lie. We design an experiment to test how the oath affects truth telling in two contexts: a neutral context replicating the typical experiment in the literature, and a “loaded” context in which we remind subjects that “a lie is a lie.” We consider four payoff configurations, with differential monetary incentives to lie, implemented as within-subjects treatment variables. The results are reinforced by robustness investigations in which each subject made only one lying decision. Our results show that the oath reduces lying, especially in the loaded environment—falsehoods are reduced by 50%. The oath, however, has a weaker effect on lying in the neutral environment. The oath did affect decision times in all instances: the average person takes significantly more time deciding whether to lie under oath.

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We focus on the design of an institutional device aimed to foster coordination through communication. We explore whether the social psychology theory of commitment, implemented via a truth-telling oath, can reduce coordination failure. Using a classic coordination game, we ask all players to sign voluntarily a truth-telling oath before playing the game with cheap talk communication. Three results emerge with commitment under oath: (1) coordination increased by nearly 50 percent. (2) senders' messages were significantly more truthful and actions more efficient, and (3) receivers' trust of messages increased.

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Despite a growing interest in the non-monetary determinants of tax behavior (tax morality), the recent literature provides little empirical evidence on the link between personality characteristics related to morality and the propensity to evade taxes. Such measures are necessary to understand the transmission channels of anti-avoidance schemes. To address this gap, this paper reports on a laboratory experiment that observes both participants' income reporting behaviors and psychological measures from the psychometrics literature: norm submission, affective and cognitive empathy, and propensity to feel shame and guilt. These measures are combined using principal component analysis to extract independent factors. Our results show that both the decision to defraud and its intensity are strongly related to affective empathy, cognitive empathy, and the public dimension of morality (measured by norm submission and shame propensity). The propensity to feel guilt, on the other hand, has no effect. Most importantly, the overall explanatory power of these individual morality measures is relatively weak. This result calls into question the hypothesis of intrinsic tax morality, and emphasizes the importance of the institutional context for understanding evasion behavior.

We evaluate the introduction of various forms of antihypertensive treatments in France with a distribution-sensitive cost-benefit analysis. Compared to traditional cost-benefit analysis, we implement distributional weighting based on equivalent incomes, a new concept of individual well-being that does respect individual preferences but is not subjectively welfarist. Individual preferences are estimated on the basis of a contingent valuation question, introduced into a representative survey of the French population. Compared to traditional cost-effectiveness analysis in health technology assessment, we show that it is feasible to go beyond a narrow evaluation of health outcomes while still fully exploiting the sophistication of medical information. Sensitivity analysis illustrates the relevancy of this richer welfare framework, the importance of the distinction between an ex ante and an ex post approach, and the need to consider distributional effects in a broader institutional setting.

Driven, in particular, by the rise of experimental economics, the recent literature has highlighted a wide range of situations in which monetary incentives fail to steer behavior in the desired direction. This observation leads to a search for alternative institutional mechanisms that can replace monetary incentives. This article reviews the work inspired by the social psychology of commitment in order to develop non-monetary mechanisms that can affect behavior. This work studies a particular commitment procedure: a truth-telling oath. This procedure has been successfully applied to (1) the problem of hypothetical bias in the revelation of preferences for non-market goods, (2) coordination failures, and (3) the propensity to tell the truth. Taken together, this work confirms the ability of commitment mechanisms to guide the design of non-monetary institutions that can effectively guide economic behavior.

Dominance solvability is one of the most straightforward solution concepts in game theory. It is based on two principles: dominance (according to which players always use their dominant strategy) and iterated dominance (according to which players always act as if others apply the principle of dominance). However, existing experimental evidence questions the empirical accuracy of dominance solvability. In this study, we study the relationships between the key facets of dominance solvability and two cognitive skills, cognitive reection and uid intelligence. We provide evidence that the behaviors in accordance with dominance and one-step iterated dominance are both predicted by one's uid intelligence rather than cognitive reection. Individual cognitive skills, however, only explain a small fraction of the observed failure of dominance solvability. The accuracy of theoretical predictions on strategic decision making thus not only depends on individual cognitive characteristics, but also, perhaps more importantly, on the decision making environment itself.

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Herein we explore whether a solemn oath can eliminate hypothetical bias in a voting referenda, a popular elicitation mechanism promoted in non-market valuation exercises for its incentive compatibility properties. First, we reject the null hypothesis that a hypothetical bias does not exist. Second, we observe that people who sign an oath are significantly less likely to vote for the public good in a hypothetical referenda. We complement this evidence with a self-reported measure of honesty which confirms that the oath increases truthfulness in answers. This result opens interesting avenues for improving the elicitation of preferences in the lab and beyond.

Real economic commitment (or the lack of it) of others affects a person's preferences to cooperate. But what if the commitment of others cannot be observed ex ante? Herein we examine how a classic non-monetary institution– a solemn oath of honesty –creates economic commitment within the public goods game. Commitment-through-the-oath asks people to hold themselves to a higher standard of integrity. Our results suggest the oath can increase cooperation (by 33%)– but the oath does not change preferences for cooperation. Rather people react quicker and cooperate, taking less time to ponder on the strategic free riding behavior.

The log-normal distribution is convenient for modelling the income distribution, and it offers an analytical expression for most inequality indices that depends only on the shape parameter of the associated Lorenz curve. A decomposable inequality index can be implemented in the framework of a finite mixture of log-normal distributions so that overall inequality can be composed into within-subgroup components. Using a Bayesian approach and a Gibbs sampler, a Rao-Blackwellization can improve inference results on decomposable income inequality indices. The very nature of the economic question can provide prior information so as to distinguish between the income groups and construct an asymmetric prior density which can reduce label switching. Data from the UK Family Expenditure Survey (FES) (1979 to 1996) are used in an extended empirical application.

How is one's cognitive ability related to the way one responds to strategic uncertainty? We address this question by conducting a set of experiments in simple 2 × 2 dominance solvable coordination games. Our experiments involve two main treatments: one in which two human subjects interact, and another in which one human subject interacts with a computer program whose behavior is known. By making the behavior of the computer perfectly predictable, the latter treatment eliminates strategic uncertainty. We find that subjects with higher cognitive ability are more sensitive to strategic uncertainty than those with lower cognitive ability.

How is one's cognitive ability related to the way one responds to strategic uncertainty? We address this question by conducting a set of experiments in simple 2 x 2 dominance solvable coordination games. Our experiments involve two main treatments: one in which two human subjects interact, and another in which one human subject interacts with a computer program whose behavior is known. By making the behavior of the computer perfectly predictable, the latter treatment eliminates strategic uncertainty. We find that subjects with higher cognitive ability are more sensitive to strategic uncertainty than those with lower cognitive ability.

A growing experimental literature has explored how monetary incentives affect truth-telling and lying behavior. We extend this literature to consider how to non-monetary incentives–a loaded environment and commitment through a truth-telling oath–affect truth-telling and lying behavior. For a loaded environment, we revise the standard lying experiment by making it explicit and clear to the person that “a lie is a lie”. We then combine the lying experiment with a solemn oath procedure, by which subjects commit themselves to tell the truth before entering the laboratory. Both non-monetary incentive devices affect a person's willingness to tell the truth: subjects lie slightly less frequently in the loaded environment, and drastically less after they signed the solemn oath. Interestingly, the loaded environment and oath have distinct effects–the oath changes the incentive to lie only when truthfulness is made meaningful through the loaded environment.

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Driven, in particular, by the rise of experimental economics, the recent literature has highlighted a wide range of situations in which monetary incentives fail to steer behavior in the desired direction. This observation leads to a search for alternative institutional mechanisms that can replace monetary incentives. This article reviews the work inspired by the social psychology of commitment in order to develop non-monetary mechanisms that can affect behavior. This work studies a particular commitment procedure: a truth-telling oath. This procedure has been successfully applied to 1/ the problem of hypothetical bias in the revelation of preferences for non-market goods, 2/ coordination failures, and 3/ the propensity to tell the truth. Taken together, this work confirms the ability of commitment mechanisms to guide the design of non-monetary institutions capable of effectively guiding economic behavior.

This study investigates whether a popular stated preference method, the choice experiment (CE), reliably measures individuals’ values for a good. We address this question using an induced value experiment. Our results indicate that CEs fail to elicit payoff maximizing choices. We find little evidence that increasing the salience of the choices or adding monetary incentives increase the proportion of payoff maximizing choices. This questions the increasing use of CE to value non-market goods for policy making.

How is one's cognitive ability related to the way one responds to strategic uncertainty? We address this question by conducting a set of experiments in simple 2 × 2 dominance solvable coordination games. Our experiments involve two main treatments: one in which two human subjects interact, and another in which one human subject interacts with a computer program whose behavior is known. By making the behavior of the computer perfectly predictable, the latter treatment eliminates strategic uncertainty. We find that subjects with higher cognitive abilities are more sensitive to strategic uncertainty than those with lower cognitive abilities.

The aim of this paper is to provide an assessment of individual uncertainty regarding length of life. We have collected original data through a survey performed in 2009 on a representative sample of 3,331 French people aged 18 or more. The survey design recorded several survival probabilities per individual, which makes it possible to compute (i) subjective life expectancy, defined as the first moment of the individual’s subjective distribution of personal longevity. (ii) the standard error of this distribution, which provides insight on the individual’s uncertainty regarding his or her own longevity. There is considerable between-individual variability in subjective life expectancies, in (small) part explained by age, illnesses, risky behavior, parents’ death and socioeconomic variables. The second main finding is that individual subjective uncertainty about length of life is quite large, equal on average to more than 10 years for men and women. It is logically decreasing with age, but apart from age, very few variables are correlated with it. These results have important consequences for public health and retirement policy issues.

Health equivalent income concept [.].

In this paper, we propose a behavioral approach to determine the extent to which the consumer/citizen distinction affects interpretations of monetary values in stated preferences methods. We perform a field experiment dealing with air pollution, where some (randomly selected) subjects are given the opportunity to behave politically by signing a petition for environmental protection prior to stating their private preferences in a standard contingent valuation exercise. We show that signing has the potential to influence respondents' willingness to pay values. Results indicate that even market-like situations are not immune to citizen behavior.

In this paper, we propose a behavioral approach to determine the extent to which the consumer/citizen distinction affects interpretations of monetary values in stated preferences methods. We perform a field experiment dealing with air pollution, where some (randomly selected) subjects are given the opportunity to behave politically by signing a petition for environmental protection prior to stating their private preferences in a standard contingent valuation exercise. We show that signing has the potential to influence respondents' willingness to pay values. Results indicate that even market-like situations are not immune to citizen behavior.

Two methods are generally considered for the evaluation of health policies. The cost-benefit approach is based on the sum of individual willingness to pay: it respects individual preferences but gives priority to the preferences of the richest people because their willingness to pay is generally higher. The cost-effectiveness approach selects policies that provide the highest overall health gain for a given total cost. It does not benefit high-income individuals, but it may have other undesirable effects, such as favoring treatment of a minor condition that will benefit the most people over a major condition that affects few. A variant of cost-benefit analysis avoids these pitfalls. It consists of weighting the willingness to pay by coefficients that vary in the opposite direction to an indicator of individual well-being combining income and health status. The indicator chosen is health equivalent income: this is the individual's actual income minus the amount he or she would be willing to forego in order to be in perfect health. For a given income, it therefore decreases when health deteriorates. Unlike subjective utility indices, it has the advantage of being based solely on the ordinal preferences of individuals. This approach is implemented through a survey conducted on a representative sample of the French population. Given their financial constraints, low-income individuals attach less relative importance to their health status. However, the coefficients obtained nevertheless allow us to overweight the least privileged individuals who have a combination of low income, poor health and a strong preference for improving their health. These coefficients can then be used to evaluate any policy for which individual willingness to pay is known.

How much of the failures to achieve Pareto efficient outcome observed in a simple 2 2 dominance solvable game can be attributed to strategic uncertainty and how much is actually due to individual bounded rationality? We address this question by conducting a set of experiments involving two main treatments: one in which two human subjects interact, and another in which one human subject interacts with a computer program whose behavior is known. By making the behavior of the computer opponent perfectly predictable, the latter treatment eliminates strategic uncertainty. Our results suggest that observed coordination failures can be attributed equally to individual bounded rationality and strategic uncertainty.

Many stated preference studies report framing effects in responses to valuation questions. Framing in stated preference studies occurs when respondents use irrelevant information contained in the question to help them value the good. This may occur because respondents are uncertain or do not hold well-formed preferences for the good in question. We investigate if respondent certainty explains framing effects in a contingent valuation study, using data from a double bounded dichotomous elicitation format and a follow-up certainty question. We investigate if respondent certainty influences anchoring and the shift effect. We find evidence that the anchoring effect is stronger for respondents who are less certain about their response to the contingent valuation question compared to respondents who are very certain. However, the shift effect is significant and negative only for respondents who are very certain. Our results indicate that certain respondents are more consistent with the predictions of rational behaviour than uncertain respondents.

We extend the individual dynamic model of lifetime resource allocation to assess the monetary value given to the increase in survival probabilities for every member of a household induced by improved air quality. We interpret this monetary value as VPF (value of a prevented fatality), which can also be expressed as a flow of discounted VOLY (value of life years) lost, and account for potential altruism towards other household members. We use a French air pollution contingent valuation survey that provides a description of the life-length reduction implied by a change in air pollution exposure. By privatising the public commodity air pollution, we succeed in ruling out any form of altruism (towards others living today and towards future generations) except altruism towards one's family. We estimate a mean VOLY of € 2001 140,000, a 30% premium for VOLY in perfect health w.r.t. average expected health status, and a mean VPF of € 2001 1.45 million for the respondent, all context-specific. In addition, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between his/her age and VOLY/VPF, and significant benevolence only towards children under 18.

[The economic valuation of a reduction in mortality risk is increasingly based on contingent valuation techniques. These techniques consist in asking a sample of individuals about their "willingness to pay" (WTP) to reduce this risk based on hypothetical scenarios. WTPs, however, depend on many factors, including the nature of the underlying risk and the scenario proposed to reduce it. This paper focuses on the reduction in mortality risk associated with exposure to air pollution and tests the effect of changing the hypothetical valuation context through three scenarios: a new drug, a move and new regulations. To analyze the WTPs reported in the different scenarios, we define a unified theoretical and then econometric framework of analysis that takes into account participants' preferences for the present, as well as those of other household members. Two results follow. The estimated implicit discount rates, specific to each of the hypothetical scenarios, turn out to be significantly different. The estimated implicit discount rates, specific to each of the hypothetical scenarios, are significantly different: around 7% for the "moving" scenario, 24% and 26% for the "drug" and "regulation" scenarios, respectively. This results in very different average "values of avoided death" (VED) between the "moving" scenario (801,000) on the one hand, and the "drug" (299,000) and "regulatory" (252,000) scenarios on the other.

We compare two approaches to measuring inequity in the health distribution. The first is the concentration index. The second is the calculation of the inequality in an overall measure of individual well-being, capturing both the income and health dimensions. We introduce the concept of equivalent income as a measure of well-being that respects preferences with respect to the trade-off between income and health, but is not subjectively welfarist since it does not rely on the direct measurement of happiness. Using data from a representative survey in France, we show that equivalent incomes can be measured using a contingent valuation method. We present counterfactual simulations to illustrate the different perspectives of the approaches with respect to distributive justice.

We argue that the economic evaluation of health care (cost–benefit analysis) should respect individual preferences and should incorporate distributional considerations. Relying on individual preferences does not imply subjective welfarism. We propose a particular non-welfarist approach, based on the concept of equivalent income, and show how it helps to define distributional weights. We illustrate the feasibility of our approach with empirical results from a pilot survey.

Eliciting sincere preferences for non-market goods remain a challenge due to the discrepency between hypothetical and real behavior and false zeros. The gap arises because people either overstate hypothetical values or understate real commitments or a combination of both. Herein we examine whether the traditional real-world institution of the solemn oath can improve preference elicitation. Applying the social psychology theory on the oath as a truth-telling-commitment device, we ask our bidders to swear on their honour to give honest answers prior to participating in an incentive-compatible second-price auction. The oath is an ancillary mechanism to commit bidders to bid sincerely in a second-price auction. Results from our induced valuation testbed treatments suggest that the oath-only auctions outperform all our other auctions (real and hypothetical). In our homegrown valuation treatments eliciting preferences for dolphin protection, the oath-only design induced people to treat as binding both their experimental budget constraint (i.e., lower values on the high end of the value distribution) and participation constraint (i.e., positive values in place of the zero bids used to opt-out of auction). Based on companion treatments, we show the oath works through an increase in the willingness to tell the truth, due to a strengthening of the intrinsic motivation to do so.