FONTAGNE Lionel

On March 10, 2021, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the border carbon adjustment mechanism that the European Commission committed to setting up. How would this adjustment work and what would be its consequences? By reducing the incentive to displace production of high-emitting products to countries with little or no carbon tax, the carbon adjustment mechanism would reduce "carbon leakage" but increase the price of carbon in the European Union (EU). Therefore, European industries that use as inputs goods subject either to the carbon tax or to the carbon adjustment are at risk of a loss of competitiveness. However, the main challenge in addressing climate change is the participation of the major emitting countries in the effort to abate greenhouse-gas emissions. While the European mechanism could help the EU in strengthening its emissionreduction targets, it is above all the compliance of the United States with the commitments made in the Paris Agreement that will make it possible to save one year's worth of global emissions by 2035, pending a more concrete commitment from China.

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Public procurement represents a substantial share of gross domestic product (GDP) in many countries, and is notoriously home-biased as a result of often opaque practices. However, little is known about the determinants of restrictions on public procurement policies. To explore this issue, we map information from the Global Trade Alert (GTA) database on regulatory obstacles to public procurement alongside international trade flows at the country pair-product level and applied bilateral tariffs. Considering the universe of restrictions introduced over the period 2009-2016 by importers on exporters and products, we highlight three novel facts. First, the main foreign providers are not the most targeted, suggesting long-term contractual relationships between buyers and sellers in public markets. Second, the ear of retaliation is alleviating the protectionist pressure in the importer country. Third, we document substitutability between public procurement restrictions and tariffs.

This paper examines the way trade and other economic interactions between countries aremodelled in the construction of baseline projections with recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. Simulations are conducted on the size of tradeelasticities, the way the trade balance is modelled (macroeconomic closure), trade growth, andenergy prices. Other topics scrutinized are the modelling of zeros, modelling of new technologies and new types of trade policies (trade in data and digitalization), phasing in of future trade policies, and migration and remittances. We conclude that there is relative consensus about the use of nested Armington preferences, whereas different scholars model the trade balance very differently. The discrepancy between baseline trade growth and historical trade growth is not considered in most models though highly relevant. Research efforts, both in terms of modelling and data collection, should be allocated to a better coverage of other items on the current account (capital income, remittances) and theinclusion of net foreign debt and asset positions,projecting trade growth based on historical patterns, and better tools to model the rapidly growing digital economy.

The new European Commission has announced policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions drastically. Reaching an ambitious target for a global good – the climate – would require a common price for carbon worldwide. This however clashes with the free-riding problem. Furthermore, unilateral policies are not efficient since they lead to carbon leakages and distort competitiveness. To tackle these issues, the European Union can rely on different policies. Firstly, a carbon pricing of imports can combined with an export rebate to constitute a ‘complete CBA’ (Carbon Border Adjustment) solution. Alternatively, a simple tariff at the border can compensate for differences in carbon prices between domestic and imported products. A consumption-based carbon taxation can al so be contemplated. Last, a uniform tariff on imports from countries not imposing (equivalent) carbon policies may help solving the free-riding problem.

The main purpose of this dissertation is to examine three issues that have received little attention in the existing theoretical work on international trade. Thus, this dissertation has three objectives. The first is to study the welfare effects of liberalizing standards between asymmetric countries. The second is to examine theoretically and empirically the income effect on trade margins and their degree of sensitivity to trade costs. The third objective is to focus on the firm-specific aspect of the price elasticity of demand beyond the CES and to examine its role in determining the magnitude and structure of trade gains. To achieve this goal, I incorporate alternative assumptions into the canonical Melitz-Chaney model of international trade with heterogeneous firms (Melitz, 2003.

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Trade elasticity is a crucial parameter in evaluating the welfare impacts of trade liberalization. We estimate trade elasticities at the product level (6-digit of the Harmonized System comprising more than 5,000 product categories) by exploiting the variation in bilateral applied tariffs for each product category for the universe of available country pairs. This is done by constructing a panel of bilateral applied tariffs and bilateral trade covering the period 2001 to 2016. We address potential endogeneity issues as well as heteroskedasticity and selection bias due to zero flows. The obtained trade elasticities are centered around -5. We finally highlight the differences in the gains from trade arising from considering heterogeneous rather than average trade elasticities. All product level elasticities are made publicly available for sake of scrutiny and use by other researchers.

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Despite the “Phase One Deal” agreed on mid-December 2019, bilateral tariffs between US and China remain at unprecedented high levels, which will have long-lasting effects. US tariffs remain very high on parts, components and other intermediate products. similarly, only the last wave of Chinese retaliatory tariffs has been half cut. We investigate in this paper how such tensions between highly interdependent economies will impact trade, income and jobs. We rely on a set-up featuring General Equilibrium, imperfect competition and importantly differentiating demand of goods according to their use, for final or intermediate consumption. This authorizes tracing the impact of protection along the value chains, on prices, value added and factor income. Additional tariffs from official lists are taken into account at the tariff line level, before being aggregated within sectors. Beyond the direct toll of sanctions, US exports to the world post a sizeable decrease as a result of reduced competitiveness led by vertical linkages along the value chains. Because of the tariffs in place as of February 2020, three quarters of the sectors decrease their value added in the US. Consistent with political economy determinants, these twists of value added are transmitted to production factors, leading to sizeable creation and destruction of jobs, and reallocation of capital to the benefit of protected sectors, mostly at the expense of their clients. Ultimately, this paper sheds light on the economic consequences of policies disrupting global value chains.

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Since the beginning of 2018, the US administration has announced and implemented several measures limiting US trade, in particular with China. This has fueled retaliation and has escalated in high trade tensions at the global level. We address in this paper the effects of the current trade tensions on trade, sectoral value added and welfare, in General Equilibrium under imperfect competition. We rely on a set-up differentiating demand of goods according to their use, for final or intermediate consumption. This authorizes tracing the impact of protection, along the value chains, on prices, value added and factor income. Additional tariffs from official lists are averaged at the 6 digit level of the Harmonized System (HS6), before being aggregated at the sector level with a reference group weighted method. Negotiated quantities in Voluntary Export Restraints are also taken into account at the product level. Beyond the direct toll of sanctions, US exports to the world post a 7.5% decrease as a result of reduced competitiveness led by vertical linkages along the value chains. Because of the measures in place as of August 2019, three quarters of the sectors decrease their value added in the US, suggesting that with this tariff war the US are shooting themselves in the foot. The quantification of job destructions and creations in the different sectors is consistent with effects channeling through prices and demand along the value chains detrimental to downstream industries.

Some countries have historically developed by opening up to trade and adopting a growth strategy driven by manufacturing exports. Trade promotes the efficient allocation of resources based on comparative advantage, with imports supporting technology transfer and productivity growth, while exports play a key role in supporting balance of payments and domestic revenue mobilization efforts. By stimulating growth, trade has the potential to reduce poverty and improve people's living conditions. Using the case of Cambodia, where the textile and garment industry provides the majority of manufacturing employment and accounts for the bulk of the country's exports, Chapter 2 shows that trade openness through manufacturing exports can improve household welfare. We use the propensity score matching method to show that the textile sector improves the welfare of the poorest 40 percent of households by increasing their consumption, asset accumulation, and the share of children attending school, as well as by reducing food insecurity and the incidence and depth of poverty. The application of the instrumental variables method also indicates that remittances from migrants working in the textile sector relax the budget constraint of recipient households and increase spending on education, health, and agricultural investments that are conducive to higher productivity. Chapter 3 takes a macroeconomic approach and explores the determinants of episodes of strong and sustained export growth. It finds that institutional quality supported by macroeconomic stability, exchange rate depreciation, export diversification, participation in global value chains, and market-oriented agricultural reforms are sources of export acceleration. Increased market competition in network industries and the lifting of capital account restrictions stimulate mainly service exports, while foreign direct investment flows support accelerations in goods exports. Applying the synthetic control method to the illustrative cases of Brazil and Peru reveals that export accelerations are followed by real GDP per capita growth and declines in unemployment and income inequality. The chapter's results indicate complementarity between goods and services and suggest that lowering barriers to trade in services would also benefit trade in goods. Chapter 4 quantifies a new source of barriers to trade related to the time it takes to process imports through customs. The unpredictability of waiting times for the clearance of imported goods undermines the reliability of the supply chain and affects the export performance of firms importing intermediate goods. Using the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator, we find that the uncertainty associated with customs clearance delays for imported intermediate goods does not affect either the entry or exit rates of manufacturing firms, but does reduce the survival rates of new exporters. This effect is heterogeneous across industries, increases over time as exporters' reputations deteriorate, and appears to be driven by South-North trade, probably because buyers in developed countries are more time-sensitive. It is also mitigated by sunk costs of market entry.

The difficulties of multilateralism have renewed interest in regionalism in trade agreements. With which partners does a country have an economic interest in signing an agreement? What would be the gains from doing so when no such agreement exists? On the contrary, are there gains to be had from signing agreements for which there is no economic interest in the first place? These are the questions that the study reported in this Letter addresses. Its results show that the decision to exit existing agreements, even if they are not justified by an economic interest, causes losses, and that there are still gains to be expected from signing new agreements for which there is an economic interest. Nevertheless, the gains to be expected from a regional agreement, such as the one pushed by China since November 2012 in response to the 11-way Trans-Pacific Partnership, are diminishing over time. Because it has become a player of global importance, it is no longer so much with its neighbors that China has an interest in signing agreements, but with other more distant global powers such as the European Union.

In Chapter 1, I examine the efficiency results of mergers among European energy producers. I calculate eco-efficiency using data envelopment analysis and the Malmquist-Luenberger productivity index. I find that domestic horizontal mergers, which are carefully regulated, have no impact. Cross-border horizontal mergers hurt eco-efficiency in the short run but boost it two years after completion. Vertical mergers hurt eco-efficiency. I present policy suggestions regarding merger regulation. Chapter 2 is a joint work with Julian Hinz. We investigate the effects of the self-imposed Russian embargo on food imports from Western countries. We build a Ricardian model with sectoral linkages, trade in intermediate goods and sectoral heterogeneity in production. Calibrating the model with real data allows us to simulate the outcomes of the embargo in terms of welfare and price changes. We further quantify the impact on consumer prices in Russia using the double-difference method. Chapter 3 is based on a paper co-authored with Cristina Herghelegiu. We investigate the use of international trade terms (Incoterms). These are the predefined patterns of cost and risk allocation between buyers and sellers. We rely on a very detailed data set on Russian exports during 2012-2015. We find that large firms are more likely to assume liabilities. Large buyers take on more responsibility regardless of the size of the seller, while large sellers do so only when their partner is small. It's more likely that the risks and costs are on the buyers in intermediate and capital goods transactions.

The paper provides an original empirical approach to investigate multi-product firms’ export patterns across destinations by considering the whole mix of products exported by a firm, formally defined as a product-vector. The proposed methodology allows to take into account a firm’s choice of both exporting and non-exporting a product to a destination and to consider different forms of product complementarity that can generate product combinations. The empirical analysis uses a panel of transactions level data for the universe of Italian and French firms and complements the existing evidence along a few dimensions. First, we show that there is a high level of sparsity: selection of products at destination is indeed very severe. Second, we document that firms export several different combinations of product vectors across markets. Relatedly a high level of diversity is detected also when considering the intensive margin, pointing to a substantial departure from a stable global product hierarchy. Finally, we provide evidence that at the same time there exists a stable component in firms’ product vectors across destinations composed by products which are not necessarily the most important in terms of sales, suggesting rich form of complementarities across goods. Products belonging to this stable component are less likely to be discarded as a consequence of an exogenous shock such as the dismantling of the MFA quotas after accession of China to the WTO.

A large portion of the productivity differentials among locations is related to density. Firms located in denser areas are more productive (Combes et al., 2012a, Econometrica). We show in this article that resource misallocation is lower in denser areas and argue that misallocation plays an important role in explaining the observed productivity premium of large cities. Using a methodology proposed by Petrin and Sivadasan (2013, Review of Economics and Statistics), we firstly assess the degree of resource misallocation among firms within sectors for each of the 348 French Employment Areas (commuting zones). Based on firm-level productivity estimates, we identify in the gap between the values of the marginal product and marginal input price the degree of input allocation at the firm level. Over the whole period 1994–2007, the average gap at firm level is 9.5 thousand euros. Secondly, we show that firm misallocation is lower in denser employment zones, suggesting that matching mechanisms on the labor market contribute to the productivity premium of agglomerated locations.

De-industrialization, accelerated by the financial crisis, is a long term process. The comparative advantage of emerging economies shifted towards more advanced goods and their growing populations commanded an increasing share in global demand. This shift towards a factory-free economy in high income countries has drawn the attention of policy makers in North America and Europe. Some politicians have articulated alarming views, initiating mercantilist or 'beggar-thy-neighbour' cost-competitiveness policies. Yet companies that concentrate research and design innovations at home but no longer have any factories there may be the norm in the future. This volume proposes an economic analysis of this phenomenon and includes 11 contributions which complement each other and tackle the problem from different angles. The evidence in this book suggests that de-industrialization is a process that happens over time in all countries, even China. One implication is that criticism of China is not likely to provide a solution to these long term trends. Another implication is that the distinction between manufacturing and services is likely to become increasingly blurry. More manufacturing firms are engaging in services activities, and more wholesale firms are engaging in manufacturing. One optimistic perspective suggests that industrial country firms may be able to exploit the high-value added and skill-intensive activities associated with design and innovation, as well as distribution, which are all components of the global value chain for manufacturing. Although this ongoing transformation of the industrial economies may be consistent with evolving comparative advantage, it has significant short-run costs and requires far-sighted investments. These include the costs to workers who are caught in the shift from an industrial to a service economy, and the need to invest in new infrastructure and education to prepare coming generations for their changing roles.

We estimate three international price elasticities using exporters data: the elasticity of firm exports to export price, tariff and real exchange rate shocks. In standard trade and international macroeconomics models these three elasticities should be equal. We find that this is far from being the case. We use French firm level electricity costs to instrument for export prices and provide a first estimate of the elasticity of firm-level exports to export prices. The elasticity of exports is highest, around 5, for export prices followed by tariffs, around 2, and is lowest for the real exchange rate, around 0.6. The large discrepancy between these elasticities makes us conclude that the international elasticity puzzle is actually worse than previously thought. Moreover, we show that because exporters absorb part of tariffs and exchange rate movements, estimates of export elasticities that do not take into account export prices are biased.

While it is a step forward, the Paris Agreement, which entered into force in November 2016, raises a number of questions, particularly with regard to "common but differentiated" responsibility - which translates into widely varying commitments from one signatory country to another - but also concerning the articulation between climate policy and trade policy. To reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, would a trade policy be better than a climate policy? If not, could it encourage more ambitious commitments to reduce emissions? This Letter shows, based on simulations of a dynamic model of the world economy developed at CEPII, that trade policy alone is not a good tool to limit CO2 emissions, but that it can complement a more ambitious policy.

Highlights The Trade Facilitation Agreement will have asymmetric effect on heterogeneous exporters. We merge French customs data with a new database of Trade Facilitation Indicators released recently by the OECD. Better information availability, advance ruling and appeal procedures mainly benefit small firms. The simplification of documents and automation tend to favor large firms. One explanation is that trade facilitation reduces the scope for corruption at borders, to the benefit of large firms. Making (Small) Firms Happy. The Heterogeneous Effect of Trade Facilitation Measures.

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To limit greenhouse gas emissions, should we restrict international trade, as advocated by the promoters of "short circuits"? By buying locally, we would save on transport costs and CO2 emissions, while promoting local employment and product quality. These arguments are important: by dissociating places of production and places of consumption, international trade contributes significantly to global greenhouse gas emissions, particularly in the transportation of goods. It also shifts the locations of emissions: the carbon footprint of OECD countries linked to their consumption is greater than the emissions produced on their territory, unlike the large emerging countries.

In order to limit global greenhouse gas emissions, should international trade be restricted, as advocated by the promoters of "short circuits"? We explain that it is not free trade that destroys the climate, but the fact that it develops in the absence of sufficiently generalized carbon pricing at the appropriate level. In order to reconcile international trade and climate, we make proposals aimed at making the different branches of international regulation work better together to ensure the development of climate cooperation.

The shift towards a “factory-free” economy has drawn the attention of policy makers in North America and Europe. Some politicians have articulated alarming views, initiating mercantilist or ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ cost-competitiveness policies. Yet companies that concentrate research and design innovations at home but no longer have any factories there may be the norm in the future. This paper summarizes the key themes emerging from a conference on de-industrialization. De-industrialization is a process that happens over time in all countries, even China. The distinction between manufacturing and services is likely to become increasingly blurry. More manufacturing firms are engaging in services activities, and more wholesale firms are engaging in manufacturing. One optimistic perspective suggests that industrial country firms may be able to exploit the high-value added and skill-intensive activities associated with design and innovation, as well as distribution, which are all components of the global value chain for manufacturing. Although this ongoing transformation of the industrial economies may be consistent with evolving comparative advantage, it has significant short-run costs and requires far-sighted investments. These include the costs to workers who are caught in the shift from an industrial to a service economy, and the need to invest in new infrastructure and education to prepare coming generations for their changing roles.

Multi-product exporters choose their product mix focusing on their best-performing products. Although their product mix varies across countries (the fickle fringe), the interdependence in demand or production technology making vectors of products systematically co-exported leads to commonalities in this mix across destinations (the stable core). In order to uncover the determinants of the fickle and stable parts of firm export product mix, we use a cross section of firm-product-destination level French and Italian data, taking explicitly into account the choice of not exporting a product to a destination. Using dissimilarity measures instead of rank correlations, we observe a great deal of variability among the product-mixes a firm exports to different destinations. We show that market size, but also the market positioning of a firm and market structure explain part of this observed variability. At the same time, together with this fickle part, we highlight the existence of a stable component among the diverse product-mixes exported. The probability of exporting this core set of products increases with the size of the destination market and with the ability to match demand, but is inversely related to market concentration.

We study international competition in high-end varieties for 416 detailed HS6 product categories marketed by the leading French luxury brands. We construct a world database of trade flows for these products, computing unit values of related bilateral trade flows and analyzing competition among the main exporters. We use the observed distribution of unit values to define a high-end market segment. Exports of high-end varieties are shown to be less sensitive to distance, and found more sensitive to destination country wealth than other varieties, but only in relation to countries already producing a large range of luxury brands, pointing to a first-mover advantage.

Highlights Stringent TBTs drive the average firm out of the market with a magnified effect for multi-destination players, who are encouraged to redirect their exports to other destinations (free of TBT concerns). Multi-destination firms are more likely to exit as a response to a stringent TBT. Thus, the imposition of a stringent TBT, by pushing multi-destination (high-productive) firms out of the market, reduces the average productivity of incumbent firms (i.e. the welfare of the imposing country). We combine aggregate estimations at sector-destination level with firm-level estimations and find that stringent TBTs represent mainly increases in fixed (more than variable) trade costs, with trade elasticity magnified for more homogeneous sectors.

We estimate the elasticity of extra EU French firm-level exports with respect to applied tariffs – a variable trade cost. We implement a method controlling for unobserved firm characteristics driving selection in exports market, and controlling for the multilateral resistance terms. Results confirm a significant negative impact of tariffs on firm-level exports, with one fifth of this impact falling on the induced adjustment in the exporters' product mix. When controlling for this adjustment and focusing on the core exported products, the elasticity of the product-destination firm-level exports with respect to applied tariffs is estimated at about −2.5.

This paper presents long-term trade scenarios for the world economy up to 2060 based on a modelling approach that combines aggregate growth projections for the world with a detailed computable general equilibrium sectoral trade model. The analysis suggests that over the next 50 years, the geographical centre of trade will continue to shift from OECD to non-OECD regions reflecting faster growth in non-OECD countries. The relative importance of different regions in specific export markets is set to change markedly over the next half century with emerging economies gaining export shares in manufacturing and services. Trade liberalisation, including gradual removal of tariffs, regulatory barriers in services and agricultural support, as well as a reduction in transaction costs on goods, could increase global trade and GDP over the next 50 years. Specific scenarios of regional liberalisation among a core group of OECD countries or partial multilateral liberalisation could, respectively, raise trade by 4% and 15% and GDP by 0.6% and 2.8% by 2060 relative to the status quo. Finally, the model highlights that investment in education has an influence on trade and high-skill specialisation patterns over the coming decades. Slower educational upgrading in key emerging economies than expected in the baseline scenario could reduce world exports by 2% by 2060. Lower up-skilling in emerging economies would also slow down the restructuring towards higher value-added activities in these emerging economies.

In spite of the significant public aid it receives, French agriculture is showing unsatisfactory results in several respects: declining employment, low income in certain activities, a marked deterioration in the environment, and an eroding commercial performance. The regulatory complexity and the cost of labor are often highlighted by the profession. But the predominance of small structures, particularly in downstream industries, the sluggishness of technical progress, an uneven level of training of farmers, the lack of coordination of the sectors and questionable non-price competitiveness strategies are also factors contributing to explain these counter-performances. In this context, public policies lack a clear direction, as their different tools sometimes pursue contradictory objectives. Agricultural policy must now be clearly refocused on key long-term objectives. Preserving natural capital must become a central axis of agricultural policy: it is both an environmental issue and a condition for the future economic success of agriculture itself. To do this, we must move towards remuneration of amenities rather than undifferentiated aid with uncertain objectives. Regulations, which are currently more restrictive than effective, must be more focused on results. To create the conditions for innovative agriculture, we should not leave promising biological innovation or spatialized data, which are becoming strategic, to a few large international companies, but rather help public research to guide this innovation so that it is more in line with biological regulations. At the same time, continuing education for farmers must be strengthened by mobilizing agricultural high schools, higher education and digital tools. For its export strategy, French agriculture should mainly rely on a small number of labels promoting health control, full traceability, the absence of antibiotics, growth promoters, or respect for the environment or animal welfare. Finally, in the face of market uncertainties, tax lightening over several years, or even the deferral of loans and social charges, should be promoted more than administered prices or counter-cyclical aid to stabilize the economic environment of producers, as should access to hedging tools. At the community level, contractual and non-transferable aids targeting public goods or with social objectives should replace area-based aids. Competitiveness, environment and income are not necessarily incompatible in agriculture. But to reconcile them, a major reorientation of policies will be necessary.

We estimate the elasticity of extra EU French firm-level exports with respect to applied tariffs – a variable trade cost. We implement a method controlling for unobserved firm characteristics driving selection in exports market, and controlling for the multilateral resistance terms. Results confirm a significant negative impact of tariffs on firm-level exports, with one fifth of this impact falling on the induced adjustment in the exporters' product mix. When controlling for this adjustment and focusing on the core exported products, the elasticity of the product-destination firm-level exports with respect to applied tariffs is estimated at about −2.5.

Despite significant amounts of subsidies, the French agricultural sector delivers unsatisfactory results in several respects: falling employment rates, partly low revenues, environmental degradation and declining commercial performance. The profession often highlights regulatory complexity and high labour costs as the main culprits. But also the predominantly small structures, in particular in the downstream industry, sluggish technical progress, unequal competence level among farmers, lacking coordination between sectors and questionable non-price competitiveness strategies add to the problem. In this context, public policies lack clear direction as various tools sometimes pursue conflicting objectives. Today, agricultural policy clearly needs to be refocused on key long-term objectives. Protection of natural capital needs to become a central part of agricultural policy. This is both an environmental issue and a condition for the future economic success of agriculture itself. To achieve this, policy needs to be directed at financing amenities, such as soil quality, rather than pursuing uncertain objectives with undifferentiated subsidies. Regulations, currently working restrictively and not effectively, need to better target results. In order to create the conditions necessary for innovative agriculture, promising biological innovations and spatial data, which are becoming strategic, should not be left to a few international companies. Instead there is a need to help public research direct the innovation, so that to ensure the compliance with biologic regulations. At the same time continuing vocational training for farmers needs to be reinforced by enhancing the role of digital tools, agricultural colleges and higher education. Regarding the French export strategy, national agriculture should principally rely upon a small number of labels promoting food control, full traceability, the absence of antibiotics and growth enhancement products and respect for the environment and animal welfare. Finally, in order to help farmers exposed to market volatility, measures such as smoothing taxes over several years, and the postponement of loan and social security contributions, as well as access to risk coverage, need to be promoted more favourably than administered prices and counter-cyclical subsidies. At the EU Community level, non-transferable contractual subsidies targeting public goods or with social objectives should substitute surface-area based subsidies. Competitiveness, environment and revenue are not necessarily incompatible in agriculture. However, major reorientation of policies is required to reconcile them.

Globalization is gaining ground in our minds every day. It is used to explain political dynamics, economic upheavals and social problems, but its own mechanisms often remain in the shadows. Globalization has its supporters and its radical opponents, and is sometimes the subject of moral judgments that prevent a proper appreciation of its complexity.This cycle suggests approaching it from the angle of knowledge and reflection. In order to shed light on this process, which has multiple and often opposing effects, academics and specialists from all disciplines will be invited: economists, political scientists, jurists, sociologists, geographers and scientists. Of course, there will always be room for debate, but it will be a debate informed by in-depth knowledge.The first four sessions will explore the globalization of the economy in order to deepen the questions that everyone is asking about inequalities, the development problems of poor countries, the effects of competition on developed countries, and the role of international regulatory bodies.Subsequent meetings will address globalization in its many effects: on politics, culture, information changes, the transformation and perception of geographical areas, crime and terrorism, law and the environment. They will lead to questions about globalization as a way of thinking about the world and living in the world.

The arrival of powerful new players on world markets –the foremost of these being China– automatically decreases market share for advanced economies. But France's export market share has decreased more than that of other European countries. This is not a result of poor geographic or sectoral specialisation, insuf-fi cient exporter support, under-representation of SMEs in exports or credit constraints, but, more fundamentally, is caused by an inadequate " quality/price ratio " for French products on average. When products are of quality, results are exceptional, as demonstrated by the luxury, aeronautical and electrical distribution goods sectors –sectors, with a flagship– and/or by brands, which appear to play a key role. A country's competitiveness comprises a price dimension and a non-price dimension. Regarding price competitiveness , direct labour costs represent just 23%, on average, of the total value of French exports and 44% when including the cost of labour for domestic intermediate consumption. Price competitiveness is therefore not solely a matter of labour costs for exporting companies. We also need to look at the input side, whether it be at intermediate goods (possibly imported), energy or even services produced in France for exporting companies. The central message here is that competitiveness is everybody's concern, and not just that of industrial companies. Greater effi ciency in non-tradable sectors (business services, construction, public services) also contributes to the creation of price competitiveness.

In spite of the significant public aid it receives, French agriculture is showing unsatisfactory results in several respects: declining employment, low income in certain activities, a marked deterioration in the environment, and an eroding commercial performance. The regulatory complexity and the cost of labor are often highlighted by the profession. But the predominance of small structures, particularly in downstream industries, the sluggishness of technical progress, an uneven level of training of farmers, the lack of coordination of the sectors and questionable non-price competitiveness strategies are also factors contributing to explain these counter-performances. In this context, public policies lack a clear direction, as their different tools sometimes pursue contradictory objectives. Agricultural policy must now be clearly refocused on key long-term objectives. Preserving natural capital must become a central axis of agricultural policy: it is both an environmental issue and a condition for the future economic success of agriculture itself. To do this, we must move towards remuneration of amenities rather than undifferentiated aid with uncertain objectives. Regulations, which are currently more restrictive than effective, must be more focused on results. To create the conditions for innovative agriculture, we should not leave promising biological innovation or spatialized data, which are becoming strategic, to a few large international companies, but rather help public research to guide this innovation so that it is more in line with biological regulations. At the same time, continuing education for farmers must be strengthened by mobilizing agricultural high schools, higher education and digital tools. For its export strategy, French agriculture should mainly rely on a small number of labels promoting health control, full traceability, the absence of antibiotics, growth promoters, or respect for the environment or animal welfare. Finally, in the face of market uncertainties, tax lightening over several years, or even the deferral of loans and social charges, should be promoted more than administered prices or counter-cyclical aid to stabilize the economic environment of producers, as should access to hedging tools. At the community level, contractual and non-transferable aids targeting public goods or with social objectives should replace area-based aids. Competitiveness, environment and income are not necessarily incompatible in agriculture. But to reconcile them, a major reorientation of policies will be necessary.

This paper presents long-term trade scenarios for the world economy up to 2060 based on a modelling approach that combines aggregate growth projections for the world with a detailed computable general equilibrium sectoral trade model. The analysis suggests that over the next 50 years, the geographical centre of trade will continue to shift from OECD to non-OECD regions reflecting faster growth in non-OECD countries. The relative importance of different regions in specific export markets is set to change markedly over the next half century with emerging economies gaining export shares in manufacturing and services. Trade liberalisation, including gradual removal of tariffs, regulatory barriers in services and agricultural support, as well as a reduction in transaction costs on goods, could increase global trade and GDP over the next 50 years. Specific scenarios of regional liberalisation among a core group of OECD countries or partial multilateral liberalisation could, respectively, raise trade by 4% and 15% and GDP by 0.6% and 2.8% by 2060 relative to the status quo. Finally, the model highlights that investment in education has an influence on trade and high-skill specialisation patterns over the coming decades. Slower educational upgrading in key emerging economies than expected in the baseline scenario could reduce world exports by 2% by 2060. Lower up-skilling in emerging economies would also slow down the restructuring towards higher value-added activities in these emerging economies.

French agriculture is showing unsatisfactory results: employment is decreasing, income is low in certain activities, the environment is clearly deteriorating and commercial performance is eroding. In this CAE Note, the three authors Jean-Christophe Bureau, Lionel Fontagné and Sébastien Jean present their findings and point out the pitfalls of public policies dedicated to this sector. They recommend a clearer orientation of agricultural policy, centered on the preservation of natural capital, research, training and the sanitary quality of products, in order to reconcile the objectives of competitiveness, environment and income.

A large portion of productivity differentials among locations is related to density. Firms located in denser areas are more productive due to agglomeration economies (Combes et al., 2012). We provide in this paper an explanation of such economies: lower input misallocation. The distribution of resources among heterogeneous firms has relevant consequences on allocative efficiency and denser areas provide a more favorable environment for dynamic matching between employers and employees. Using a methodology proposed by Petrin and Sivadasan (2013) we are able to assess the degree of resource misallocation among firms within sectors for each of the 96 French "Départements". Based on firm-level productivity estimates, we identify in the gap between the value of the marginal product and marginal input price the output loss due to inefficiencies in inputs allocation. Over the period 1993-2007 the average gap at firm level is around 10 thousands euro, showing a relevant increase starting from the early 2000s. Importantly, firms misallocations are lower in denser areas, suggesting that the matching mechanism is playing a role in explaining the productivity premium of agglomerated locations.

This paper investigates how tariff liberalization has aected exporting at the product-destination level in emerging countries. We use a highly disaggregated (6 digit level of the harmonized system HS classication) bilateral measure of market access to compare taris applied in 1996 and 2006, which includes the timing of the Uruguay Round and episodes of bilateral liberalization. Our econometric estimations consider impacts of tari cuts on three components of the trade margins: extensive margin of entry (new trade relationships at the product-destination level), extensive margin of exit (disappearance of existing relationships) and intensive margin of trade (deepening existing relationships). Our main estimates indicate that a reduction of bilateral applied taris of 1 percentage point increases the extensive margin of entry by 0.1% and the intensive one by 2.09%, while it reduces the extensive margin of exit by 0.25%.

The arrival on world markets of new powers - first and foremost China - is mechanically reducing the market shares of the advanced economies. But France's export market share is falling more than those of other European countries. This is not the result of poor geographic or sectoral specialization, insufficient aid to exporters, under-representation of SMEs in exports, or credit constraints, but more fundamentally of an insufficient "quality-price ratio" of French products, on average. When quality is present, the results are exceptional, as shown by luxury goods, aeronautics and electrical distribution equipment, all sectors driven by one or two flagship companies and/or brands that seem to play a key role. A country's competitiveness has both a price and a non-price dimension. In terms of price competitiveness, the direct cost of labor represents only 23% on average of the value of French exports, and 44% including the cost of labor for domestic intermediate consumption. Price competitiveness is therefore not just a matter of labor costs in exporting companies. It must be sought on the side of inputs, whether intermediate goods (possibly imported), energy or services produced in France for exporting firms. The central message here is that competitiveness is everyone's business, not just that of industrial companies. Better efficiency in sectors sheltered from international competition (business services, construction, public services) thus contributes to price competitiveness.

In recent years, many preferential trade agreements have been signed that reduce barriers to trade between countries. Many of these agreements have included provisions for non-tariff measures. This research examines whether technical requirements in North-South agreements have an impact on international trade. Specifically, the authors analyze the extent to which the harmonization of technical regulations creates or reinforces a "center-periphery" trade pattern that is potentially harmful to the integration of Southern countries into the global economy. The empirical results of the study confirm this conjecture.

We revisit competitiveness issues using recent data and show that the global financial crisis has taken a toll on European producers that before 2007 were maintaining their market positions. The EU competitiveness in goods has recently deteriorated, even in the upper and high-tech segments of the world market. The decline recorded by European exporters is attributable purely to performance and not to adverse orientation of their exports. However, European exports are predominantly "Made in Europe" and include an increasing share of services. The within Europe advantages in manufacturing seem to have been exhausted and further gains imply moves outside the EU with an enhanced focus on the competitiveness in services as an important determinant of future European industry.

Negotiators have reached a deal on a limited series of issues WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali (3–6 December 2013), one of these being trade facilitation. Based on a quantitative assessment taking into account the detail of the last proposals circulated, we argue however that due to the design of the negotiation, achievements of the DDA will eventually be limited. This is due to a lack of ambition making it difficult for negotiat ors to compensate their own concessions. Such feebleness is induced by the way negotiations were organized – in separate groups, without much consideration for, or understanding of, how the different elements added up to more than the sum of the parts. Our quantification of these issues is performed with a dynamic computable general equilibrium model of the world economy, while liberalisation of tariffs is taken into account at the product level in order to address exceptions, flexibilities as well as the non-linear design of the formulas. A reduction in domestic support and the phasing out of export subsidies in agriculture are taken into account, as well as trade facilitation. Our conclusion is that negotiators will have to re-bundle the bits of the negotiation and shift efforts towards the neglected issue of services to make progress towards the objectives agreed on in Bali.

The geography and composition of international trade are changing fast. We link a macroeconomic growth model and sectoral CGE framework in order to project the world economy forward to the year 2035 and assess to what extent current trends in trade are expected to continue. Constructing fully traceable scenarios based on assumptions grounded in the literature, we are also able to isolate the relative impact of key economic drivers. We find that the stakes for developing countries are particularly high: The emergence of new players in the world economy, intensification of South-South trade and diversification into skill-intensive activities may continue only in a dynamic economic and open trade environment. Current trends towards increased regionalization may be reversed, with multilateral trade relationships gaining in importance. Hypothetical mega-regionals could slow down, but not frustrate the prevalence of multilateralism. Continuing technological progress is likely to have the biggest impact on future economic developments around the globe. Population dynamics are influential as well: For some countries, up-skilling will be crucial, for others labour shortages may be addressed through migration. Several developing countries would benefit from increased capital mobility. others will only diversify into dynamic sectors, when trade costs are further reduced.

This paper analyzes how multi-product firms adjust their exported product-mix across destinations. Using cross sections of Italian and French data, we show that firms do not follow a rigid ordering in their product mix exported in different markets but rather they adapt their choices to better match with country characteristics. By using metrics based on export shares and on sequences of product names we provide new insights on the extent a firm’s products portfolio changes across destinations that go beyond simple rank correlations. Demand asymmetries, market structure heterogeneity and differential abilities to match unit values of products supplied by competitors emerge as three significant factors in explaining the variety-country variability observed in firms’ export patterns. Our results resist when we control for a firm’s choice of not exporting an available product to a given destination, an explicit choice likely to contain relevant information.

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is under negotiation. This report provides a detailed overview of EU-US agricultural trade. It analyses current barriers to trade, paying special attention to nontariff measures. This information is then used in a computable general equilibrium model of international trade to assess the potential impact of the TTIP on agri-food exports, imports and value added. This study also includes a general discussion on the opportunities and risks of a TTIP for the EU agricultural sector.

In a context of low growth, high unemployment, unbalanced public finances and a persistent external challenge, we are seeing the return of a proactive discourse on industrial policy and even, in France, of direct intervention in industry. Thus, targeted public intervention by sector is once again conceivable, while industry is once again seen as a reservoir of jobs, exports and growth. No industry, no future? This Note does not consider the answer to be obvious. A reflection seems essential at the same time on the object of the industrial policy (what is the industry and in what is it necessary?) but also on its methods (does the State have the tools, the information and the modus operandi of its intervention?) The frontier between industry and services has become blurred: services have become an industry . industry buys and sells services . finally, a part of the companies classified in services are in reality industrial companies having split their value chain at the international level. Industrial activity today consists of designing products, ensuring or transferring their production while retaining intellectual property rights, organizing the value chain, controlling brands and access to consumers, and finally appropriating returns on investment.

In a context of weak growth, high unemployment, unbalanced public fi nances and persistent external defi cit, we are witnessing the return of a proactive approach to industrial policy and, even in France the return of direct intervention in industry. Sector-focused public intervention is thus once again conceivable, while industry is once more perceived as a reservoir of jobs, exports and growth. Can there be a future without industry? Answering this question is not considered as obvious in this Note. Refl ection appears to be essential with regard to the aim of industrial policy (what is industry and why is it needed?) as well as its methods (does the government have the tools, information and modus operandi required for its action?) The frontier between industry and services has become blurred: services have become an industry. industry buys and sells services. and fi nally, a proportion of companies classifi ed as services are in reality industrial companies that have split their value chain at the international level. Today, industrial activity consists in designing products, producing them or having them produced, while retaining intellectual property thereof, organising the value chain, controlling brands and consumer access, and fi nally making returns on investment.

In a context of low growth, high unemployment, unbalanced public finances and a persistent external challenge, we are seeing the return of a proactive discourse on industrial policy and even, in France, of direct intervention in industry. Thus, targeted public intervention by sector is once again conceivable, while industry is once again seen as a reservoir of jobs, exports and growth. No industry, no future? This Note does not consider the answer to be obvious. A reflection seems essential at the same time on the object of the industrial policy (what is the industry and in what is it necessary?) but also on its methods (does the State have the tools, the information and the modus operandi of its intervention?) The frontier between industry and services has become blurred: services have become an industry . industry buys and sells services . finally, a part of the companies classified in services are in reality industrial companies having split their value chain at the international level. Industrial activity today consists of designing products, ensuring or transferring their production while retaining intellectual property rights, organizing the value chain, controlling brands and access to consumers, and finally appropriating returns on investment.

This paper develops a model of cross-border M&A activity that features firm-level productivity shocks and endogenous export activity. We show that foreign firms will be relatively more attracted to targets in the domestic country that had high productivity levels that induced them to invest in large export networks several years prior to acquisition, but subsequently experienced a negative productivity shock (i.e., cherries for sale). From the theory we derive a dynamic panel binary choice empirical model to predict cross-border M&A activity, and find strong evidence for our hypotheses connecting the evolution of firm-level productivity to the ultimate targets of cross-border acquisitions using French firm-level data.

No summary available.

Economic projections for the world economy, particularly in relation to the construction of Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) baselines, are generally rather conservative and take scant account of the wide range of possible evolutions authorized by the underlying economic mechanisms considered. Against this background, we adopt an ‘open mind’ to the projection of world trade trajectories. Taking a 2035 horizon, we examine how world trade patterns will be shaped by the changing comparative advantages, demand, and capabilities of different regions. We combine a convergence model fitting three production factors (capital, labor and energy) and two factor-specific productivities, alongside a dynamic CGE model of the world economy calibrated to reproduce observed elasticity of trade to income. Each scenario involves three steps. First, we project growth at country level based on factor accumulation, educational attainment and efficiency gains, and discuss uncertainties related to our main drivers. Second, we impose this framework (demographics, gross domestic product, saving rates, factors and current account trajectories) on the CGE baseline. Third, we implement trade policy scenarios (tariffs as well as non-tariff measures in goods and services), in order to get factor allocation across sectors from the model as well as demand and trade patterns. We show that the impact of changing baselines is greater than the impact of a policy shock on the order of magnitude of changes in world trade patterns, which points to the need for care when designing CGE baselines.

Economic projections for the world economy, particularly in relation to the construction of Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) baselines, are generally rather conservative and take scant account of the wide range of possible evolutions authorized by the underlying economic mechanisms considered. Against this background, we adopt an ‘open mind’ to the projection of world trade trajectories. Taking a 2035 horizon, we examine how world trade patterns will be shaped by the changing comparative advantages, demand, and capabilities of different regions. We combine a convergence model fitting three production factors (capital, labor and energy) and two factor-specific productivities, alongside a dynamic CGE model of the world economy calibrated to reproduce observed elasticity of trade to income. Each scenario involves three steps. First, we project growth at country level based on factor accumulation, educational attainment and efficiency gains, and discuss uncertainties related to our main drivers. Second, we impose this framework (demographics, gross domestic product, saving rates, factors and current account trajectories) on the CGE baseline. Third, we implement trade policy scenarios (tariffs as well as non-tariff measures in goods and services), in order to get factor allocation across sectors from the model as well as demand and trade patterns. We show that the impact of changing baselines is greater than the impact of a policy shock on the order of magnitude of changes in world trade patterns, which points to the need for care when designing CGE baselines.

No summary available.

Economic projections for the world economy, particularly in relation to the construction of Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) baselines, are generally rather conservative and take scant account of the wide range of possible evolutions authorized by the underlying economic mechanisms considered. Against this background, we adopt an ‘open mind’ to the projection of world trade trajectories. Taking a 2035 horizon, we examine how world trade patterns will be shaped by the changing comparative advantages, demand, and capabilities of different regions. We combine a convergence model fitting three production factors (capital, labour and energy) and two factor-specific productivities, alongside a dynamic CGE model of the world economy calibrated to reproduce observed elasticity of trade to income. Each scenario involves three steps. First, we project growth at country level based on factor accumulation, educational attainment and efficiency gains, and discuss uncertainties related to our main drivers. Second, we impose this framework (demographics, gross domestic product, saving rates, factors and current account trajectories) on the CGE baseline. Third, we implement trade policy scenarios (tariffs as well as non-tariff measures in goods and services), in order to get factor allocation across sectors from the model as well as demand and trade patterns. We show that the impact of changing baselines is greater than the impact of a policy shock on the order of magnitude of changes in world trade patterns, which points to the need for care when designing CGE baselines.

We use data on individual French exporters to document how a change in trade costs following the introduction of the euro affected firms' export margins in relation to export decisions, the number of products exported and average sales per product. Our results confirm two effects predicted by the theory: firms increase the range of products they export as well as their intensive margin. This effect is most evident in markets with moderate monetary policy coordination before 1999. General equilibrium competition effects reduce the initial positive impact on each of these margins. We find no evidence of firms' increased export participation.

In this paper, we shed light on the selection of the benefi ciaries from the French competitiveness cluster policy which was launched in 2005 and extended to 2012. We disentangle the selection and self-selection eff ects, as emphasized in the theoretical literature on regional and industrial policy. Our main conclusion is that winners were (self-)selected at both steps of the procedure, and that this holds for the three cluster types: worldwide clusters , potentially worldwide clusters and national clusters . We thus provide a methodology which allows us to contrast the e ffective outcomes of the selection process and the official objectives of cluster policies in terms of targeting, and which thus helps in their econometric evaluation.

Using an econometric shift-share decomposition, we explain the redistribution of world market shares at the level of the product variety and by technological content. We decompose changes in market shares into structural eff ects (geographical and sectoral) and a pure performance e ffect. We regard the EU-27 as an integrated economy, excluding intra-EU trade. Revisiting the competitiveness issue in such a perspective sheds new light on the impact of emerging countries on the reshaping of world trade. Since 1995 the EU-27 withstood the competition from emerging countries better than the United States and Japan. The EU market shares for high-technology products, as well as in the upper price range of the market, proved comparatively resilient, though less so since the crisis.

We study international competition in high-end products for 416 detailed HS6 product categories marketed by leading French luxury brands. We construct a world database of trade flows for these products in the period 1994-2009, computing unit values of related bilateral trade flows and analyzing competition among the main exporters. We use the observed distribution of unit values to define a high-end market segment. In 2009, Europe's market share (EU27 plus Switzerland) despite suffering some erosion since 1994, represented three-quarters of the world market. Exports of high-end products are shown to be less sensitive to distance than other products, and found more sensitive to destination country wealth than other products, but only in relation to countries already producing a large range of luxury brands.

Relocation of production to developing countries in the manufacturing sector has increased dramatically over the past three decades. A large body of economic literature shows that globalization and the offshoring of manufacturing to developing countries have been accompanied by negative effects. One response to these negative perceptions of globalization has been the rise of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These activities, defined by Baron (2001) as private policies, have grown rapidly primarily because the traditional regulation of labor and environmental standards and the government monitoring and enforcement systems on which they depend have proven inadequate to the changing global economy. This research analyzes the economic implications of the emergence of private policies for higher social standards in developing countries characterized by very weak enforcement mechanisms. We conduct a theoretical and empirical analysis exploring the microeconomic aspect of social norms. Specifically, we want to assess the effects of: I) trade policies aimed at inducing Southern firms to respect social standards, II) NGO activism in favor of workers in domestic enterprises in poor countries, III) NGO enforcement strategies on firms' incentives to invest in "socially responsible" technologies, IV) the effects at the industrial level of increasing NGO pressure on multinational firms.

Both trade and investment in services have grown considerably in recent decades due to technological advances in telecommunications and transportation. Increasingly, services have become an important issue in negotiations at the bilateral and multilateral levels. However, liberalizing services does not mean negotiating tariff cuts but requires market access. Using a gravity-based approach, the first chapter takes stock of the degree of openness for eleven sectors and sixty countries. The estimated degree of liberalization varies across countries and is not uniform for any given country. By signing an agreement specifically on trade in services, member countries significantly increase their trade. However, only those agreements that contain few sectoral exceptions and that negotiate advanced liberalization of trade in services have a significant impact. The content analysis of regional agreements shows that liberalization of temporary movement of people is largely hampered. By simulating several scenarios in a general equilibrium model, chapter 3 shows that countries gain from liberalizing their cross-border services trade, both direct investment and temporary entry for services suppliers. The determinants of investment in services are similar to those for goods, namely market potential and investment costs. Moreover, investment decisions are particularly interdependent. The regions differ in their types of investment: developed countries attract more horizontal direct investment, whereas investment is vertical in nature in developing countries. Through the different chapters, this thesis highlights the importance of considering services by taking into account its specificities and its different modes.

The growing interest of economists in South-North migration has given the South the status of emigration country and the North the status of immigration country. However, when one looks closely at the data, one finds that South-South migration is as important as South-North migration. The scale of South-South migration has made some developing countries into countries of origin, transit, and destination. As for the impact on the labor market, two contradictory effects can be observed: on the one hand, immigration as well as migration between regions within the country increases the pressure on the local labor market and subsequently the incentive to migrate. On the other hand, emigration can be used either to increase wages or to reduce unemployment in the regions of origin, thereby enhancing internal migration as well as immigration. While most economists have particularly neglected this aspect, this thesis seeks, first, to illustrate the interdependence between these different migration flows. It concludes that the impact of migration on the labor market in the country of origin should be carefully analyzed by taking into account the entry and exit of workers. This thesis also focuses on the investment of remittances in the real estate sector and concludes that channeling remittances into productive sectors does not have a positive impact on the economy when the real estate sector is highly integrated into the economy. It also concludes that it is in the interest of the Moroccan economy to pursue trade liberalization efforts to reduce migration flows.

The second wave of globalization, which occurred in the second half of the 20th century, contributed to the increased integration of world economies through the increased exchange of goods and financial assets between nations. In particular, financial openness has contributed to creating new investment opportunities, thus promoting access to finance in both developing and developed economies. At the same time, the dramatic reduction in transportation costs for goods has created new opportunities for the exchange of goods. Overall, this increased dependence of the world's economies contributed to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, and to the de jure floating of exchange rates, thereby promoting current account adjustment. At the same time, however, it appears that the evolution of world trade is intriguing in several ways.

This thesis examines two aspects of the relationship between international trade and intranational geography. The first part analyzes the consequences of international openness on the spatial distribution of productive activities within countries. The first chapter develops a three-region model. It is shown that when domestic regions have a locational advantage or disadvantage with respect to foreign markets, trade integration can either favor the agglomeration of production in the border region or, on the contrary, reinforce the concentration of production in remote regions. The second chapter contains an empirical application of this prediction to Central and Eastern European countries. The second part of the thesis analyzes how the location of production within a country can influence its export performance. The last three chapters use firm export data available from INSEE. Chapter 3 contributes to the literature on extensive and intensive trade margins, and shows that intranational transaction costs affect both the number of exporting firms and the volume exported per firm. Chapter 4 shows the presence of export spillovers, emphasizing their country- and sector-specific nature. Chapter 5 examines the impact of foreign immigrants on trade at the firm level. The presence of foreign immigrants in a French department increases the probability that firms will start exporting to the immigrants' country of origin.

The last two decades have been marked by a significant increase in the activity of multinational firms. This increase has coi͏̈ncided with a deepening, multilateral and bilateral trade liberalization. In this context, this thesis aims to analyze, in theoretical and empirical terms, the strategies of multinational firms in an environment characterized by a liberalization of international trade in goods. The first part of the paper focuses on the investors' choice of an internal organization and a location adapted to their objectives. The first chapter distinguishes between the different forms of multinationalization of firms. Based on the observation that there is a diversity of strategies among firms, we propose a typology of these strategies that we apply to foreign subsidiaries in France. The second chapter analyzes, by means of a theoretical model, the determinants of intra-firm trade in intermediate goods. Chapter 3 discusses the location choice of multinational firms for a particular entry mode: cross-border mergers and acquisitions. The second part of the thesis examines the link between trade liberalization and firm strategies. The theoretical model developed in chapter 4 highlights the role of these firms in the industrial restructuring induced by trade liberalization. Indeed, mergers and acquisitions can constitute an alternative to the exit of firms. Chapter 5 then analyzes the discriminatory nature of North-South regional agreements. Firms from within and outside the zone can interact to crowd out the constituted market. The insights gained from this theoretical chapter are then applied to the consequences of the formation of the North American Free Trade Agreement on the automotive industry in Mexico (chapter 6).

"This thesis compares the effects of regional and multilateral openness in the case of Morocco and Tunisia, examples of "small" developing countries facing these options. The first chapter measures the protection of Tunisian and Moroccan markets, the second chapter situates the protection of the European Union (EU) vis-à-vis Morocco and Tunisia in the context of the common trade policy. The third chapter is devoted to an estimate of the impact of the dismantling of the MFA (Multi-Fiber Agreement) and the accession of the CEECs (Central and Eastern European Countries) on European imports of clothing, a key sector for Mediterranean countries. A gravity equation taking into account tariff and non-tariff barriers is constructed. The negative impact of tariffs on imports is immediately apparent, while the negative impact of quotas is significant after controlling for endogeneity bias using instrumental variables. The estimates show that the end of the MFA will have a substantial impact (more than the accession of the CEEC). The fourth chapter is a synthesis of the theoretical arguments made about the impact of regionalism and multilateralism on global welfare or for a participating country. The non-reciprocity of an agreement is likely to limit the gains from regional openness. The Vinerian analysis suggests that unilateral liberalization would avoid the costs of trade detour, but liberalization among "natural" partners is likely to limit these costs. The fifth chapter is devoted to the construction of a computable general equilibrium model (a static model with perfect competition) which tends to show that the medium-term effects of these two trade strategies on these two countries are, on the one hand, weak or negative, and, on the other hand, not very different. Alternatives concerning taxation, exchange rate policies or access to the EU are considered. ".

In this thesis, we propose an analysis of the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the total factor productivity (TFP) of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. The analysis is an extension of the debate on the nature of growth in Asian countries and a search for ways in which these countries can improve their TFP. We focus this research on FDI as a channel for host countries to access foreign R&D externalities. From a theoretical point of view, we show that the effect of inward FDI on the TFP of these countries is through the indirect effect of increasing imports of intermediate goods and equipment to meet the production needs of subsidiaries. From an empirical point of view, our estimates give three results. The first, derived from a time series analysis over the period 1977-96, shows growth based largely on the accumulation of production factors in the countries studied. The improvement in TFP over the period analyzed is small. The second result, obtained by panel and time series analyses over the period 1982-96, shows a positive and significant impact of foreign R&D externalities transferred by FDI and imports on TFP. The third result, based on panel analysis of the 1982-96 period, suggests that inward FDI significantly increases imports of intermediate goods and equipment. We therefore conclude that it is possible for a country to rely on inward FDI to improve its output growth, while emphasizing that the impact of FDI on growth relies on the import-increasing effect of this investment.

This thesis attempts to answer two questions: 1/ To what extent can openness to international trade affect the degree of competition in a market? and 2/ What are the ways in which trade, through its impact on competition, can affect sectoral wages and employment? In the first chapter, we show that trade is associated with strong competition via a high price elasticity of estimated import demand. But when we estimate an index of aggregate concentration (i.e. taking into account both domestic and foreign producers) in chapter 2, we find that it does not decline with foreign penetration in OECD countries. The third chapter, offers the literature a new theoretical and easily testable linear relationship between wages and export market shares. In contrast to the case of Asian and Latin American countries, we find that in OECD and Mediterranean countries an increase in export market share in foreign markets but also in the domestic market is associated with an increase in sectoral wages. Finally, in the last chapter, we argue that the literature has often considered the substitution effect in the study of the trade-employment link. However, we show theoretically and then by means of empirical tests on developed and developing countries that imports and exports have a demand effect, which is always positive for employment. The idea is that openness, by increasing efficiency and/or competition in the market for a good, reduces its equilibrium price, which translates into an increase in its total demand, this effect being beneficial to all actors, domestic and foreign, in the market.

The theories of the new geographic economy predict a strengthening of spatial agglomerations with the intensification of economic integration. The issue at stake is therefore crucial for the European Union, which simultaneously displays the objectives of integration, global development and regional cohesion. Our work aims to deepen the theoretical framework and to evaluate empirically the risks of spatial divergence induced by the unification of European markets. This theoretical and empirical work is therefore based on three fields of analysis: spatial economics, international trade and growth. Our theoretical contributions lead us both to broaden the conclusions of geographical economy models and to put them into perspective. By introducing the dynamics of comparative advantage into a static model, we show that too little integration can also lead to economic polarization. Moreover, by coupling a spatial economy model to a growth dynamic based on human capital accumulation, we show the existence of a trade-off between the objectives of cohesion and maximum growth. Chapter 6 shows the empirical relevance of the cohesion/growth trade-off at a sufficiently fine level of spatial aggregation. This confirms the conclusions of chapters 2 and 3, which aim to calibrate all the parameters of the static model on European regional data. This original empirical work confirms the relevance of geographical economy models. However, by estimating the points at which equilibria break down, we show that the polarization of activities can only appear on a relatively small scale, notably because of the low mobility of European workers.

To try to answer the following questions, does openness necessarily lead to growth? Under what conditions? I have structured my work in three parts: The first part begins with a review of studies that seek to describe the links between openness and economic growth. However, exports, or more generally openness, are not enough to cause growth. It is this observation that leads me to say that openness is not an engine of growth, as investment can be, but that it is a catalyst. The second part focuses on the determination of the appropriate study framework to identify the impacts of openness on growth: long-run gains are shown to be a dead end. The medium-term impacts are analyzed in a neo-classical framework and then in an endogenous growth framework. In both cases, the ambiguity of the links between openness and growth is strongly apparent. An empirical application to the case of Mexico shows that these medium-term phenomena, such as the dynamics of market structures, have a strong influence on the vision of the gains from openness. This ambiguity of the gains is also expressed when we look at the external framework in which this openness takes place, that is, the institutional framework of openness. The third section describes the advantages and disadvantages of such institutionalization strategies, as well as the dangers posed by the new trade negotiations: intellectual property, social and environmental clauses.

Collusion between shipowners has existed for more than a century and stems from the characteristics of the liner market. The alliances on a global scale of capacity since 1994 now bring together 13 of the world's top 20 shipping lines and are justified mainly by the exploitation of economies of scale and operational synergies and raise the question of the gains (efficiency) and losses (market power) that they bring. The estimation of density economies on east/west shipping routes precedes a model of optimal fleet allocation for the 13 shipowners operating within the 4 main strategic alliances in 1997. It tests the hypothesis of operational synergies and emphasizes that a strategic alliance may seek to increase market share and/or geographic scope of services. The reorganization of services into star networks leads to a hierarchization of high and low density networks analyzed by the evolution of container traffic in 110 European ports from 1988 to 1998. The hierarchization reinforces the divergence of interests between port and maritime operators (generalized costs) and pushes handling operators to a similar process of consolidation. This new balance of power between actors is illustrated by dedicated terminals that imply exclusive access within a port. A queuing model contrasts the potential gains for shipowners obtaining exclusivity (waiting time) with the potential losses (port occupancy rate). In the end, it appears that strategic alliances may correspond, according to hypotheses on network externalities, to the construction of barriers to entry through horizontal and vertical integration and ultimately lead to a change in the regulation of regular lines.

The theory of factor proportions, and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem in particular, remains the mainstay of the analysis of the influence of international trade on the labor market of industrialized countries. We argue that this view is simplistic, in that international trade does not only induce inter-sectoral reallocations. It is also a vector of increased competitive pressure, the effects of which are felt within sectors. We propose a first concrete illustration by showing that trade increases the average efficiency of sectors, through increased selection of firms. Beyond this aspect alone, various arguments suggest that international trade can modify the nature of the productive apparatus within sectors. The econometric estimates presented here confirm this by showing that an increase in imports in a sector leads to an increase in apparent labor productivity and an increase in the average skill level of the workforce. We then propose an evaluation of the resulting impact on relative wages, using a computable general equilibrium model. We then integrate an adapted model of the labor market (ws-ps model). The overall effect of trade intensification on the aggregate real income of "rich" economies remains positive. Nevertheless, the impact of international trade on the wages and/or unemployment of the unskilled appears significantly unfavorable. The simulations also show that the impact of trade between industrialized countries is comparable or even greater than that of trade with poor countries. Finally, we argue that trade openness can also increase the price elasticity of labor demand.

The european union's trade relations with third countries are characterized by a hierarchical network of trade preferences. This hierarchy is exercised through a variety of instruments, both within the framework of trade policy and other policies such as the common agricultural policy or the European Coal and Steel Community. The position of each European partner in this hierarchy, as well as the volume of bilateral trade, is determined by the measures applied to imports from that partner. In this thesis, we first construct the European preference pyramid, based on indicators of sectoral tariffs and non-tariff barriers, which allows us to identify precisely the relative positions of European trading partners. In this pyramid, Mercosur occupies an unfavorable position. This position is further weakened by the very composition of its exports to the EU, which are concentrated in sensitive products. The detailed analysis of the evolution of the structure of European imports and of European protection vis-à-vis Mercosur illustrates this observation. The empirical evaluation of the impact of the European preference hierarchy on EU-Mercosur trade relations highlights three main points. First, there is an unfavorable bias against Mercosur in the EU's external relations, indicating the existence of significant potential trade between the two regions. Second, the empirical analysis done at a disaggregated level allows us to identify the main products involved in this potential trade and to highlight the limitations of the gravity approach for analyzing the impact of trade barriers at a very fine level of disaggregation. Third, the empirical analysis highlights the relevance of the theoretical arguments of endogenous protection.

By entering into a voluntary export restraint (VER), a government, an industry lobby or the producers of an exporting country commit themselves to private or public agents in the importing country to limit their supply of a particular good for export to the market in question. Why, then, has the rve become widespread since the 1970s, knowing that it is the worst, or almost the worst, situation in terms of welfare for the importing country, and knowing that the rve is negotiated at the initiative of the importing country. In the presence of competitive production structures, only the fear of retaliation makes this quantitative restriction "voluntary". With oligopolistic production structures, the interest in the dream depends on: its restrictiveness, the nature of the restricted goods (complementary or substitutable for unrestricted goods). the strategic variable. the conjectural variables prior and subsequent to the dream. the number of firms. the degree of product differentiation. The dream is preferred to traditional protection because it acts on the conjectural variables. But the preference for the rve over other non-tariff barriers (NTBs) is more problematic because these NTBs also modify the strategic interactions between firms. The discriminatory nature of the rules makes them ineffective, and therefore strictly necessary, since new ones must be negotiated. Indeed, first, dream expectations are generally self-fulfilling and deprive domestic firms: the dream creates the situation it aims to correct. When the dream expectation leads to dumping, the anti-dumping procedure can be concluded by a legal dream. Secondly, since the rve is circumvented in the long run through reorganizations of trade, production and factor endowments, the extension of its coverage, sectoral and geographical, becomes necessary. A computable general equilibrium model quantifies non-marginal changes in the rve for France in 1985 (decomposed into 14 sectors). The rve are suboptimal for France because the French welfare increases with their abandonment, and increases even more with their pricing: the latter is sought by the importer. With the 1994 GATT reforms, legal protections or more private dreams are likely to replace government dreams.