Dissertation on competitive and directed search.

Summary We take the wage announcement approach with job search to study three problems in the labor market. The first problem concerns the premature termination of workers. Such premature work stoppage creates turnover risks for firms, so firms want to offer wage profiles to minimize these risks. In this problem, asymmetric information plays an important role. We adopt a mechanism design approach and consider the different timings at which private information is realized. In a follow-up paper, we propose a specific Age policy by which this inefficiency can be mitigated, and study its implication on welfare and aggregate output. In the second problem, we revisit the welfare analysis of the impact of discrimination on skill choice under a multidimensional hiring standard along characteristics that are either productivity-related or productivity-independent. We show how strategic skill investment between the favored and discriminated group arises. We also compare two wage determination mechanisms (advertised and negotiated wage) to check the robustness of results. In the third problem, we consider the extent to which the unemployment benefit and the minimum wage can correct inefficient allocations arising from the market power of firms. Our context concerns small markets where the ratio of workers to firms is not large. The market imperfection arises from the fact that in the small-scale labor market firms pay less than the competitive wage level. We proceed from an industrial organization point of view, and propose focusing on the misallocation of employment and surplus when analyzing the effectiveness of the policy instrument.