Three essays on the economics of image motivation.

Summary The first trial uses a neuroeconomic experiment to compare the effect of social exposure on two types of pro-social behaviors: doing good and avoiding doing harm. We find that image gains from visible acts of generosity are computed as rewards in both cases. Selfish decisions without negative image consequences are computed differently: not doing good (and thus saving money) correlates with brain regions related to reward, whereas doing bad (and thus gaining money) correlates with brain regions related to punishment anticipation and moral disgust.The second trial investigates how information about the true effectiveness of charities (and its social visibility) affects the contributions of small donors. We find that individuals ignore poor performance of charities when the donation is covered by anonymity but increase their contributions to charities that perform better than expected. However, when the amount donated and the recipient's effectiveness are public knowledge, donors motivated by social image concerns treat the quantity and quality of their donations as proxies.The third essay studies the effects of control in principal agent relationships where monetary interests are aligned. By comparing direct control with general impersonal rules, we show that direct control generates more hidden costs on the agent side than impersonal rules. At the same time, managers tend to exercise less authority when rules are impersonal, as this forces them to signal their greed even when it is not necessary.