Cooperative and strategic market games.

Summary This thesis consists of two parts: The first part focuses on cooperative market games and the second on strategic market games. In the case of cooperative market games, the link between cooperative games and markets and the associated solution concepts are studied. Together with Jan-Philip Gamp we show the following results: For cooperative market games with transferable utility we present a proof that generalizes the results of Shapley and Shubik (1975) to convex and closed subsets of the heart following a remark of the authors. For cooperative market games with non-transferable utility we extend the results of Qin (1993) to a large class of closed subsets of the inner core. Next, we study the relationship between the inner core and asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions for bargaining games. A strategic market game is a non-cooperative game used to describe price formation in an exchange economy. In this thesis the starting point is the model of Giraud and Weyers (2004). For finite horizon strategic market games, I show proving a theorem analogous to a folk theorem, that even in the presence of collateral requirements, almost anything is possible as long as the players are patient enough. Finally, in a joint work with Gaël Giraud, for strategic market games with infinite horizon and uncertainty we prove a partial folk theorem à la Wiseman (2011).