Evaluation and Imperfect Information.

Summary This thesis presents three experiments on employee performance appraisal.Appraisal is a very important management tool in an environment where the employer has an imperfect initial belief of the performance of its employees. Among other things, it allows the employer to improve its information on the performance of its employees. The first test focuses on the initial phase of the appraisal process: How does the employer revise his belief about his employee's performance using an imperfect signal? The results show that, on average, the use of an imperfect signal helps subjects to identify an uncertain state of nature. However, subjects revise their belief in a non-optimal way when the signal confirms their initial belief.The second step in the evaluation process is the appraisal interview, during which the employer can transfer information to the employee. This feedback can be manipulated by the employer. The second chapter examines how the employer manipulates the evaluation and the impact of this manipulation on the employee's choice of effort. The results show that employers manipulate the information given to their employees who respond by increasing their effort. Furthermore, the manipulation that overestimates the employee's ability is significantly more used than the manipulation that decreases it.The final chapter focuses on assessment bias using a real effort experiment. While the majority of raters manipulate the appraisal to increase their payoff, the results show that guilt plays an important role in the decision to lie or not.