The epistemological foundations of the Law & Economics movement.

Summary This thesis aims to show that the economic analysis of law is a philosophy of suspicion, a logical system of interpretation of legal phenomena that can provide us with knowledge if we take into account its quality as a system of interpretation. Since economic propositions are largely analytical, they can inform us only by the questions they raise. Economic reasoning is first of all a code of perception based on two concepts: rationality and efficiency. This code of perception gives us intuitions that "seem" relevant to the study of law (both what law is and how to approach legal reasoning). The question then arises as to what makes the proposed knowledge "valid". A priori or empirical considerations seem insufficient to account for the relevance of this type of analysis. We finally propose an approach in terms of reversal: it is only by grasping that the code is only a code and by confronting its propositions with other points of view that we can hope to gain "knowledge". The economic analysis of law also raises the question of the legal analysis of law.