Economic and Institutional Dynamics of Electricity Industry Deregulation: The Role of the Sector Regulator in the Interaction with Competition Authorities

Summary In this thesis, we propose the definition of a global monitoring procedure involving network operators, regulators and competition authorities in the definition of efficient market structures and rules for electricity exchange. We show that the effectiveness of this procedure depends on the possible antagonism in the exercise of decision-making powers delegated to the regulator and those held by the competition authorities. A comparative study of the PJM and NET A markets then allows us to define two possible models of delegation and coordination of supervisory powers. We show that they alternatively favor a "strong" informational coordination between regulator and network operator or a "strong" decisional coordination between regulator and competition authorities. In the last part, these conclusions are put in perspective with the problem of creating an integrated European market for electricity exchange. We show that the approval of regional market initiatives requires the delegation of decision-making powers to a supranational regulatory agency, "constrained" by "strong" decision-making coordination with the European Commission in the exercise of EU competition law.