Essay on the distribution of responsibility for insured risks applied to construction insurance.

Authors
Publication date
1999
Publication type
Thesis
Summary Construction insurance in France is governed by the modified law of January 4, 1978 (the Spinetta law), which institutes a double insurance obligation against the decennial risk: the damage insurance [do] of the building owners and the decennial liability [rd] of the builders. This paper presents a theoretical framework of this system based on models of insurance a la mossin. A set of contracts between insurers is demonstrated. It shows that the bid of a single insurer dominates the bids of two separate insurers because of its << coordination >> value, and not because of cross-subsidies between contracts. The study then turns to the allocation of liability, which includes three aspects in construction: - coverage for the failure of a builder during the course of construction. This risk would justify the prohibition of the deductible in C insurance in the case of a ten-year risk. On the other hand, it would appear desirable to make the client pay a deductible in the event of the bankruptcy of the builder. - the distribution of responsibilities between builders. This question depends on the insurable mass of each participant and the cost of expertise of the responsibilities. In some cases, it is advisable to have recourse to the expertise in a random way. The offer of separate insurers may dominate that of a single insurer because the latter has a weaker commitment power. In the absence of commitment problems, the separate insurers' offer is always dominated (sometimes strictly) by that of the single insurer. The latter benefits from the value of coordination when information is symmetrical and uses cross-subsidies when there is moral hazard. - the distribution of responsibilities between victims and manufacturers. The exemption from liability regime dominates the strict liability regime in a context of antiselection. This result may remain, even in a context of moral hazard, when markets for non-decreasing claims are possible.
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