Wage negotiations, labor disputes and unemployment.

Summary Collective bargaining plays a dominant role in most OECD countries. This thesis focuses on wage bargaining and its influence on the functioning of the labor market. These topics have been the subject of much research, but the originality of this thesis lies in the following three points: first, the study of the dynamic structure of wage bargaining and the possibilities of renegotiation, second, the consideration of information asymmetries and strikes, and third, the analysis of the consequences of wage bargaining within intertemporal general equilibrium models. This thesis is composed of three parts. The first part is devoted to a microeconomic analysis of labor negotiations and conflicts, the second to an empirical study of wages and strikes, and finally, the third part is devoted to studying some macroeconomic consequences of wage negotiations. The usual modelizations of wage negotiations, based on the use of the Nash criterion (1950), do not allow us to account for renegotiations and strikes. The objective of the first part is to explore the tools of strategic analysis that can fill these two gaps. The second part proposes an empirical evaluation of the theories exposed in the first part, on the one hand by constructing and testing a wage equation corresponding to an extension of the wage bargaining model of the first chapter, and on the other hand by identifying the main empirical determinants of strikes. The third part proposes to analyze some macroeconomic consequences of wage negotiations through two intertemporal general equilibrium models.