Foundations and macroeconomic implications of profit sharing.

Summary The objective of this thesis is to analyze, both at the level of agents' behavior and at the macroeconomic level, the implications of a compensation system based on profit sharing. Chapter 1 is devoted to the analysis of the firm's behavior in a sharing situation. Chapter 2 first extends the study of the consequences of sharing on the decisions of decentralized agents, by integrating it into contemporary analyses of the labor market (theory of wage bargaining, implicit contracts, the efficiency wage). It then examines its strategic properties within a duopoly model of the industry. Chapters 3 and 4 attempt to assess the incentive qualities of the usual wage system and profit sharing. Their main objective is to identify the conditions under which the introduction of a sharing formula could increase productivity. Finally, the last two chapters analyze the macroeconomic properties of the sharing economy by comparing them to those of the wage economy.