A conventionalist approach to the labor market based on corporate recruitment.

Summary This thesis proposes to renew our understanding of the functioning of the labor market by basing it on the recruitment logic of firms. Moreover, the choice is made to adopt a "conventionalist" reading of a "conventional" hypothesis in labor economics: matches between workers and firms are risky and heterogeneous, and the Economics of Conventions raises the problem of defining the quality of these matches. The dissertation consists of two parts of two chapters. The first part - the firm's power to value - is devoted to the internal operation of firms in assigning a value to people, i.e. the evaluation of the candidates they select or the employees they pay. Evaluation during recruitment is analyzed in Chapter 2, while Chapter 1 presents the coherence of the evaluation conventions present in a company that coordinates "its" three markets: product, capital and labor markets. The second part - the form investments of the matching function - highlights the matching activities that take place in the labor market. The intermediaries and channels that "shape" the market (by defining its rules, boundaries and information format) are presented in chapter 3. Finally, Chapter 4 proposes a typology of matching dynamics based on the channels that firms use to address their external market, which implies that they rely on certain form investments rather than others.