Le séminaire se tiendra en salle Edmond Malinvaud (312) au siège de l’Université (bâtiment Ile-de-France, Evry-Courcouronnes), de 14h30 à 15h30.


“We study a team problem in which two players contribute to a common project that leads to a success with some probability increasing with effort. Players are informed of the success or the failure of their partner with a time lag $Delta$. We interpret this delay as a technological constraint on information transmission.
We find that, contrary to case without delay in which payoffs and efforts are constant at the symmetric equilibrium, the equilibrium payoff follows a regular cyclical pattern and the strategies are bang bang. Also, there exists a asymmetric equilibrium if and only if $Delta$ is sufficiently small.”

Chantal Marlats (Panthéon-Assas)


  • Université d’Evry-Val-d’Essonne


Université d’Evry-Val-d’Essonne Boulevard François Mitterrand, Evry, 91025 France