FLM Recherche : Complications in Cooperating when Players are Asymmetric: Theory and Experimental Evidence Cet événement est passé. 18 novembre @ 12 H 30 min - 14 H 00 min L'événement est en anglais. Intervenant Charles F. Mason est HA. chaire économie du pétrole et du gaz naturel. Il est également Professeur au Département d’économie, Université du Wyoming Titre Complications in Cooperating when Players are Asymmetric: Theory and Experimental Evidence Résumé I study an indefinitely repeated game where players’ payoffs are asymmetric. Attempts to cooperate in such an environment, for example by rationing actions in proportion to some measure of size, have generally struggled in practice. Successful cooperation requires setting shares so that neither player will defect, which commonly requires allocating shares that disproportionately favors the player with larger payoffs — which the smaller player is unlikely to accept. One resolution to this conflict arises when players’ utility depends on payoff differences, which tends to increase the smaller player’s share. I then analyze experimental data that sheds light on this issue. I find that smaller players do not reduce their actions proportionately to their one-shot Nash equilibrium level. While inconsistent with the standard repeated-game result, this outcome is consistent with the version of the model where players’ payoffs reflect inequality aversion. Informations pratiques Friday Lunch Meeting aura lieu de 12.30 pm – 2.00 pm L’inscription au séminaire se fera en distanciel uniquement Pour y participer nous vous invitons à vous inscrire ici Le lien vous sera communiqué une fois votre inscription réalisée. Si vous souhaitez recevoir des invitations aux FLM, présenter vos œuvres ou vous désinscrire de la liste de diffusion, n’hésitez pas à contacter cette adresse : flm@ChaireEconomieduClimat.org Organisateur Chaire Economie du Climat Lieu Webinaire