Electricity pay-as-bid market: the best response of a producer

 

Organisation : Delphine Lautier, Emmanuel Gobet, Clémence Alasseur

Lieu : Salle 05 – Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie – Paris 5eme
Date : Vendredi 6 mars 2015

Heure : 14h00
Intervenant: Didier Aussel (UPR CNRS 8521 & Université de Perpignan)

 

Sujet: Electricity pay-as-bid market: the best response of a producer, joint work with Pascale Bendotti (Osiris – EDF R&D) and Miroslav Pistek (Czech Academy of Sciences)

 

 

Résumé: 

We model the competition of producers in deregulated electricity pay-as-bid market as multi-leader-follower game with an Independent System Operator (ISO) playing a central role. We propose an analytical solution to a problem of one producer, i.e., we construct the best response of a producer for all the possible market configurations (demand, bid curves of the other producers).

In some cases the best response does not exist and a limiting best response, i.e., sequence of bid functions yielding the positive supremum of profit, is determined instead.